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ABSTRACT
The subject of petrodollar recycling has frequently captured the interest of
academics, politicians and the media. Specifically, the issue typically boils down
to one central question: where exactly are the petrodollars—revenue earned from
the sale of oil—flowing? According to traditional scholars like Bernard Mommer
and Terry Lynn Karl the recurring argument is that in oil-exporting nations, oil
revenues are channeled directly into the hands of a few government officials
resulting in corruption, inequality and economic decay.
However, the main limitation of this traditional argument is that it tends to
focus solely on the dynamics between the national level and local communities.
With the increasing trends of globalization and financialization, I find the
traditional viewpoint to be outdated and too narrow in focus. Hence, I argue that
when the perspective is expanded from the national to the international an
intriguing aspect materializes: in reality, the majority of oil revenues are actually
flowing out of the state and into global financial markets.
Before I examine how petrodollars reach international financial markets it
is necessary to review the traditional literature regarding oil-exporting nations.
Hence, section one assesses the classic tale of oil-exporters and concludes with
the introduction of a new actor for managing oil revenues: Sovereign Wealth
Funds (SWFs). Since they are a relatively unknown concept, section two serves
as a general introduction to sovereign wealth funds. Next, section three elaborates
on the previous discussion by providing an in-depth case study of the main
Middle Eastern funds while section four examines the impact of these funds on
international finance. Lastly, in section five I return to the traditional concept of
the resource curse and examine how sovereign wealth funds impact their domestic
economies.
Over the past ten years, the rise of sovereign wealth funds as major players
in international finance has generated a wide array of sensationalist perspectives
and has left the general public with a sense of confusion regarding the true nature
of sovereign wealth funds. Thus, my goal is to provide a more realistic and
pragmatic view of the role of sovereign wealth funds in both their international
and national space.
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PREFACE
“Between corrupt mortgage brokers, feckless lenders, and risk-happy
hedge funds, there’s plenty to keep investors and policymakers up at
night. But recently a new item has appeared on the list of things to worry
about: so-called sovereign wealth funds, which are investment funds
controlled by foreign governments.”1
With headlines reading “The Invasion of the Sovereign Wealth Funds”2 in
the Economist, “Sovereign Wealth Funds Spark Concerns”3 in the New York
Times and “US Fears Over Sovereign Wealth Fund Threat ‘Legitimate’”4 in the
Financial Times, the world was introduced to the next great villain of
international finance. Sovereign wealth funds have all the ingredients for disaster:
in the name of privatization and capitalism it is bad enough that they are the
investment arms of foreign governments, but of even more concern in a post 9/11
world is that many of these ‘foreign governments’ belong to Arab, nondemocratic, anti-western countries. Case closed? Not exactly.
Paradoxically, during the same timeframe (between 2007-2009) the exact
same mainstream news outlets portraying sovereign wealth funds as the enemy
ran articles entitled: “Superfunds to the Rescue”5 (Economist), “Big Payday for
Rescuers in the Crisis”6 (New York Times), and “From Vultures to White
Knights”7 (Financial Times). Evidentially, the image and role of sovereign

1

James Surowiecki, "Sovereign Wealth World," The New Yorker (2007).
The Economist, "The invasion of the sovereign-wealth funds," The Economist (2008).
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Stephanie Kirchgaessner, "US Fears Over Sovereign Wealth Fund Threat ‘Legitimate',
Says Official," The Financial Times (2007).
5
The Economist, "Superfunds to the Rescue," The Economist (2007).
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Eric Dash, "Big Paydays for Rescuers in the Crisis," The New York Times (2009).
7
The Financial Times, "From Vultures to White Knights," The Financial Times (2009).
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wealth funds is unclear. Sovereign wealth funds have been cited as signifying
everything from corruption, fear, and destabilization to globalization, cooperation
and economic development. What exactly are these so-called ‘Sovereign Wealth
Funds’ and more importantly: are they villains or are they heroes?
Surprisingly, the media hype surrounding sovereign wealth funds is a
recent development. In fact, the term ‘sovereign wealth fund’ itself was only
coined in 20058. However, the aforementioned speculations stem from a much
older debate concerning the flow of petrodollars—the revenue earned from the
sale of oil. Specifically, the issue boils down to one central question: where are
the petrodollars flowing? According to traditional literature, the recurring
argument is that in oil-exporting nations, oil revenues are channeled directly into
the hands of a few government officials resulting in corruption and inequality. In
essence, traditional literature portrays oil as curse ultimately resulting in “rich
countries with poor people.”9
However, the main limitation of the traditional literature on oil-exporting
nations is that it tends to focus solely on the dynamics between the national level
and local communities. I argue that when the perspective is expanded from the
national to the international an intriguing phenomenon materializes: in reality, the
majority of oil revenues are actually flowing out of the state and into global
financial markets. How exactly are these petrodollars reaching international

8

Andrew Rozanov, "Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?," State Street Global Advisor
(2005): 1-4.
9
Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Making Natural Resources into a Blessing rather than a Curse,"
Covering OIl: A Reporter's Guide to Energy and Development (2005): 19.
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financial markets? The answer is none other than the infamous sovereign wealth
funds.
Again, we return to a rather prevalent and important question: what are
sovereign wealth funds? Ultimately, this is a question with many answers. Are
they extensions of corrupt authoritarian governments looking to maximize
personal wealth over social welfare? Are they mechanisms for the Arab world to
take over key US industries like defense and technology? Are they simply
‘rational’ investors, looking to maximize returns on investments? Or are they
tools for economic development, seeking to eradicate the resource curse once and
for all?
In order to discover the true nature of sovereign wealth funds, it is
necessary to start from the very beginning. Hence, section one will commence
with a look at the history of oil-exporting countries during the 20th century and the
concurrent ascent of sovereign wealth funds. Section two will then serve as a
general introduction to the concept of sovereign wealth funds. Section three will
elaborate on the previous discussion by providing an in-depth case study of the
main Middle Eastern funds while section four will examine the impact these funds
have on international finance. Lastly, in section five we will return to the
traditional concept of the resource curse and examine how sovereign wealth funds
impact their domestic economies. All in all, it is my hope that by the end of this
study the reader will walk away with a clearer, more realistic image of sovereign
wealth funds. Albeit for better or for worse.

1

SECTION 1
The Classic Tale of Oil-Exporters
“Control over access to natural resources - and, therefore, to the territories
where they are located - has been at the origin of countless conflicts, which can
be traced back to the beginnings of civilization and have continued to exist up to
the present.”10
The classic story of oil-exporting countries revolves around the underlying
concept of Sovereignty. At the most general level, the Treaty of Westphalia
(1648) established that “states have sovereignty over the land and people in their
territories.”11 More specifically, the sovereignty desired the most by oilexporting countries is the acknowledgement of a state-owned natural resource
(oil) and “the right to grant or deny access to this land.”12 Unfortunately, as most
traditional literature highlights, the road towards sovereignty has been
characterized by booms and busts. To illustrate these ups and downs, prominent
scholars like Bernard Mommer and Terry Lynn Karl call attention to the different
phases of oil regimes.13 Furthermore, while the oil-exporting countries’ initial
struggle and successful emergence from domination experienced during the first
oil regime is indeed significant, most traditional literature tends to concentrate on

10

Bernard Mommer, Global Oil and the Nation State (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002) 1-255.
11
“Sovereignty” In, The Dictionary of Human Geography, 5th Edition, Derek Gregory,
Ron Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael J. Watts, and Sarah Whatmore (eds.) 706-707,
Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
12
Mommer 2002, 98.
13
Traditional Literature refers mainly, but is not limited to the following works: Bernard
Mommer, Global Oil and the Nation State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002),
Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkely:
University of California Press, 1997), Jeffrey D. Sachs, Joseph E. Stiglitz Macartan
Humphreys, Escaping the Resource Curse (New York: Columbia University Press,
2007), Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political
Regimes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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the height of oil-exporting countries’ sovereignty. Specifically, traditional
literature emphasizes the phenomenon known as the resource curse whereby the
abundant and plentiful oil revenues experienced by oil-exporting countries at the
height of their sovereignty were initially perceived as a blessing and how these
same revenues become a curse and ultimately result in “rich countries with poor
people.”14 While there is abundant evidence supporting a theory of the resource
curse, traditional literature tends to stop at this dismal conclusion; ultimately
painting an incomplete, oversimplified picture. When reexamining what
traditional literature overlooks, the future potential for oil-exporting nations
appears to be more optimistic than initially expected.

Initial Struggle for Sovereignty
First Oil Regime: Absolute Minimal Sovereignty
The first oil regime began early in the 20th century with the initial
discoveries of oil in the Middle East. Following the discovery of oil, concessions
were granted under colonial and imperial control, establishing a period of foreign
domination over oil-exporting countries. The first concession was the D’Arcy
concession in 1901 when Persia was divided up between the British and the
Russians15. Subsequently, other countries followed suit and eventually “every
single concession covered a large part, if not all, of the national territory of these
countries.”16 Furthermore, it is worth noting that many of these concessions were
intended to remain in effect for the long run with some lasting between 75-100
14

Stiglitz 2005, 19.
Mommer 2002, 118.
16
Ibid.
15
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years. With German, British and Dutch interests all competing for concessions, it
came as no surprise that the United States became interested as well. By 1928, “a
U.S. - dominated alliance of British, Dutch, and U.S. oil companies” came
together to form the International Oil Cartel (AKA the “Majors”) and “controlled
world oil production and set the world market price.”17 By controlling both
production and prices, the “Majors” essentially controlled the entire oil industry
(outside the United States). As a result, “the absolute dominance of the oil
companies over the exporting states characterized this regime.”18
The main thrust of the control was asserted outside of the US market due
to the fact that the US market was more competitive thanks to the presence of
several small independent oil companies. Furthermore, this increased competition
in the United States resulted in a higher price of oil due to higher production
costs. Hence, the “Majors” selected the price of oil to be in accordance with US
prices because “oil production was significantly cheaper in all other oil-producing
nations.”19 This difference between the high price of oil, in accordance with
higher U.S. costs, and the low cost of production in oil exporting countries
enabled the Majors to extract a surplus of profits.
Good news for the international oil companies, but what about the oilexporting countries? Intrigued by the surplus profits, oil-exporting countries
sought to increase their share of oil revenues as well. However, the advent of
17

Fernando Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1997) 53.
18
Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkely:
University of California Press, 1997) 51.
19
Coronil 1997, 53.
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concessions introduced an important concept to oil-exporting countries: “the
payment to landlords in exchange for access to sub-soil resources.”20 This is
otherwise known as rent and in the case of oil-exporting countries the state was
the landlord. Initially, the Majors came together in the Red Line Agreement of
1928 and agreed not to compete for concessions in an effort to limit the amount of
ground rent allotted to landlords. The original rent or royalty was “set at 4
shillings per ton of oil and if profits were increasing it could increase to 6
shillings and 2 shillings if profits fell.”21 The rent was a flat rate (4 shillings per
ton of oil) and was only allowed to fluctuate, albeit slightly, if the price of oil
increased or decreased. Hence, the rent was dependent and determined by price,
otherwise known as differential rents.22 Thus, oil-exporting countries’ ability to
increase their oil revenues was sharply limited and dependent upon international
oil companies’ surplus profits.
Second Oil Regime: Increase in Bargaining Power
One of the main reasons why the “Majors” were able to exert so much
control and dominance over the oil-exporting nations was the prevalence and
nature of the colonial system. As Mommer states, “no modern sovereign country
would ever hand over to a few private companies the control of its natural
resources.”23 Hence, the decline in colonialism after World War II took a
significant toll on “the major’s” power and influence. In addition, “the emergence

20

“Thad Dunning, Does Oil Promote Democracy?: Regime Change in Rentier States
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 39.
21
Mommer 2002,120.
22
Coronil 1997, 53.
23
Mommer 2002, 161.
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of independent oil companies into the world market increased competition and
thus oil-exporting countries were able to improve their bargaining positions.”24
With more players entering the market, oil-exporting countries began to compare
their concessions with their neighbors, in particular the royalties, and started to
demand a greater share of the oil revenues.
Evidence of this increase in bargaining power on behalf of the oilexporting nations is demonstrated by profit sharing agreements adopted in the
early 1950s. After World War II, the price of oil nearly doubled and hence the
ground rent was expected to rise to the standard upper limit of 6 shillings.
However, the international oil companies already instituted a generous fifty-fifty
profit sharing agreement with the government of Venezuela because they deemed
this to be the ultimate fair compromise for both sides.25 This fifty-fifty profit
sharing agreement quickly became the gold standard across the Middle East as
well. Hence, the international oil companies became aware of the increased
bargaining power on behalf of the oil-exporters and used the fifty-fifty profit
sharing agreement as an attempt to appease them.
Considering oil prices had been relatively stable throughout this time, the
price collapse in 1959 was the catalyst for oil-exporting countries to take action.
Since their rents were dependent and determined by prices, the decrease in prices
illuminated how little control oil-exporters had over the fate of their own
resources. Hence, in 1960 oil-exporting countries formed their own cartel
otherwise known as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
24
25

Karl 1997, 51.
Mommer 2002, 125-133.
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“A cartel of landowners, not producers.”26 Initially, OPEC was established to
promote price stability, however the desire to increase oil revenues enticed
members of OPEC to increase prices in order to increase their own revenues.
Hence, whereas oil-exporting countries’ rent once was determined by price,
OPEC was now driven to set a price determined by rent. This form of rent is
known as an absolute rent because it reflects the power of the landlords in
determining rent.27 In sum, the creation of OPEC signified “the right of all
countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.”28

Height of Sovereignty and the Struggle to Retain it
Oil as a Blessing
The newfound ability and potential for oil-exporting countries to finally
capitalize and profit from their natural resource endowments generated strong
sentiments of optimism and hopes for prosperity. Terry Lynn Karl provides the
best description of the significance of OPEC for oil-exporting nations:
By seizing the institutional capacity to set prices for oil and by
nationalizing their domestic production, these countries which
had been virtual case studies of foreign domination in the past,
finally appeared to gain control over their primary natural
resource.29
After a many years of dominance, oil-exporting countries were finally not only
able to control their own production, but now they were even able to control

26

Coronil 1997, 54.
“Rent” In, The Dictionary of Human Geography, 5th Edition, Derek Gregory, Ron
Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael J. Watts, and Sarah Whatmore (eds.) 644-645,
Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
28
Mommer 2002, 151.
29
Karl 1997, 3.
27
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prices. The first major instance of this price control was when OPEC started to
decisively raise the price of oil between 1970 and 1973 in an attempt to offset the
devaluation of the US dollar.30 The real tipping point occurred with the start of
the Yom Kippur war on October 6th 1973.31 In opposition to the US’s support of
Israel in the war, OPEC decided to exercise its bargaining power and instituted an
embargo against Israel’s supporters. Furthermore, OPEC raised the price of crude
oil 17% to $5.12 per barrel on October 16th and again on December 22nd from
$5.12 to $11.65 per barrel.32 The Arab Oil Embargo eventually ended in on
March 18th 1974, however the price increases generated extremely large revenues
for oil-exporting countries. In fact, “in the brief period from 1970 to 1974 alone,
government revenues of OPEC nations leapt eleven fold.”33
The traditional literature is keen to focus on this “golden period” because
these revenues were expected to be the drivers of economic development,
bringing prosperity and wealth to oil exporting countries. As Karl asserts, “new
revenues from petroleum would provide the resources necessary to catch up to the
developed world while simultaneously bringing political stability and a better life
for the people.”34 However, in reality as Mommer points out, “the economic and
political performance of the Third World oil-exporting countries after the OPEC

30

The devaluation of the US dollar occurred in 1971 after the United States discontinued
the use of the Gold Exchange Standard, allowing the US dollar to float. Since oil is
priced in terms of US dollars, oil-exporting nations’ revenues decrease as a result of the
depreciation.
31
Energy Information Administration, "Annual Global Oil Market Chronology," 2007, 151.
32
Ibid.
33
Karl 1997, 3.
34
Ibid.
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revolution has been rather poor.”35 This phenomenon is what is widely referred to
as the resource curse.

Oil as a Curse
While oil was initially viewed as a blessing for oil-exporting countries,
Joseph Stiglitz echoes traditional literature when he points out “it appears that, on
average, resource-rich countries have performed worse than those with smaller
endowments.”36 Specifically, “countries benefiting from a wealth of natural
resources have experiences on average a lower economic growth rate than
resource-poor ones over the past 30 years.”37 What specifically do low levels of
economic growth entail? To elaborate, instead of economic growth and prosperity
Karl describes that oil-exporting countries have experienced the following
ailments:
Poor economic diversification, dismal social welfare
indicators, high levels of poverty and inequality,
devastating environmental impacts, rampant
corruption, exceptionally poor governance, and high
incidences of conflict and war.38
Why have oil-exporting countries been unable to translate their massive
amount of revenues into sustained increases in economic growth and prosperity?
One commonly cited culprit is the so-called “Dutch Disease” whereby non-oil
exports become non-competitive thanks to the oil sector driving up the exchange
rate of the local currency.39 The model developed by W. Max Corden and J. Peter

35

Mommer 2002, 233.
Stiglitz 2005, 13.
37
Philippe Le Billon, "The Resource Curse", Adelphi Papers 45.373 (2005): 11-27.
38
Karl 2005, 22.
39
Ibid.
36
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Neary in 1982 assumes two sectors in an economy: the tradable sector (natural
resources, agriculture and manufacturing) and the non-tradable sector (services).40
When the price of a natural resource significantly increases, it impacts the
economy in two ways. The first is the “spending effect” whereby the additional
revenue causes an increase in the demand and price of non-tradable goods over
tradable agriculture and manufactured goods (lagging sector). However, since the
prices of tradable goods are set internationally, they remain unchanged. This
results in a decrease in exports of the ‘lagging’ sector and an increase in imports
to meet the rising demand.
The second effect is the “resource movement effect”, whereby the
resource boom causes a shift in labor and capital towards the natural resource
sector away from other sectors of the domestic economy. As a result, “Output
declines in the non-resource economy, but by more in tradables, where prices are
fixed at world market levels.”41 The combined result of both effects is the decline
in output of the lagging export sector (manufacturing and agriculture) and the
appreciation of the real exchange rate—increase in the price of non-tradable
goods compared to tradable goods.42 Ultimately, Dutch Disease is one
explanation why oil-exporting countries’ lack economic diversification.
Another popular reason for oil-exporting countries’ demise is the incentive
for rent-seeking behavior. In “rentier states”, where the primary source of

40

Otaviano Canuto, Ekaterina Vostroknutova, Milan Brahmbhatt, "Dealing with Dutch
Disease," Economic Premise 16 (2010): 1-7.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
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government revenue accrues from natural resource rents, the government is
completely dependent on the rents rather than on the taxation of its citizens. “The
massive flow of natural resource revenues into the fiscal coffers of the state
engendered perverse political as well as economic effects…fostered corruption,
weakened accountability and heightened incentives for rent-seeking.”43 Therefore,
the very presence of rents along with oil-exporting countries’ desire to increase
such rents creates a viscous circle with the wealth ending up in the hands of a few
(government) while the rest of the population is left out. Ultimately, resulting in
‘rich countries with poor people’.

Painting a Clearer Picture
What Traditional Literature Overlooks
To better understand the limitations of traditional literature on oilexporting countries, we begin by identifying the primary focus of the majority of
literature. For starters, they all correctly identify the shift in bargaining power
over the 20th century from the Majors, ultimately to the oil-exporting nations.
Next, traditional analysis heavily focuses on the height of the oil-exporting
countries’ sovereignty when the abundant and plentiful oil revenues were
perceived as a blessing and how these same revenues became a curse and
ultimately led to the downfall of many oil-exporting nations. What is most
interesting and prominent is how traditional literature is quick to put the blame on
political institutions and governmental policies as the reason why oil revenues
often turn into a curse. Karl is the main advocate of this sentiment and states:
43

Dunning 2008, xv.

11
That the petro-state depends on revenues generated by a
depletable commodity, that this commodity produces
extraordinary rents, and that these rents are funneled
through weak institutions virtually ensure that the public
sector will lack the authority and corporate cohesiveness
necessary to exercise effective capacity.44
Hence, traditional literature on oil-exporting countries tends to concentrate on
the fact that the revenues are channeled into the hands of the few elite, resulting
in corruption and inequality.
However, traditional literature fails to ask the most fundamental
questions of all: if the money is not being channeled back into the state and
reaching the citizens, then where exactly is it going? Whereas traditional
literature tends to focus solely on the dynamics between the national level and
local communities, the answer to this key question requires a shift from a
national-scale to a global perspective. Indeed, in this age of increasing
globalization the majority of this money is flowing out of the state into the
global financial markets.

Shift in Perspective
The widespread increase in globalization and financialization around the
world highlights the emerging importance and influence of international markets
rather than governments. Out of the traditional literature, Bernard Mommer is
the only one to highlight this important shift. His analysis embodies this trend by
asserting that consuming countries and exporting nations interact and compete for
power via the international financial markets.45 As a result, Mommer claims that
44
45

Karl 2005, 58.
Mommer 2002, 232.
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we have entered a new phase where the sovereignty of oil exporting countries is
being threatened and gradually taken away by consuming nations’ dominance of
the global financial markets.
Traditional literature on oil-exporting countries paints a rather dismal
picture of oil-exporting countries’ pasts and eminent futures. While Mommer’s
argument is a step in the right direction by acknowledging an international scope,
he paints the same dismal picture as other traditionalists by overlooking the ways
in which exporting countries can link to international markets and to consuming
countries and thus retain bargaining power. Most importantly, he underestimates
the potential wealth and strategic use of oil-exporting countries’ revenues. Hence,
Mommer makes the same detrimental mistake as other traditional literature by not
exploring the actual flow of these petrodollars.
When the increasing role of global markets and financialization is taken
into account it does not come as a surprise that a significant proportion of oil
revenues is channeled out of the oil-exporting country and into global financial
markets. In sum, Mommer and traditional literature overlook oil-exporting
countries’ potential to be taken seriously as independent sovereign players in the
global financial arena. In fact, if traditional literature expanded their perspective
to include international financial markets they would find that in reality, many oilexporting countries have already started to use their wealth to their advantage and
have successfully secured themselves a seat at the table with other major players
in international finance.

13

SECTION 2
Introduction to Sovereign Wealth Funds
“Paradoxically, despite the prospects of wealth and opportunity that accompany
the discovery and extraction of oil and other natural resources, such endowments
all too often impede rather than further balanced and sustainable
development.”46

When viewed only in terms of a domestic perspective, the history and
future prospects of oil-exporting countries appears to be extremely bleak.
However, once the perspective shifts from a local level to an international scale
the picture looks drastically different. Although the players are the same as in
traditional literature (Oil Exporters vs. Consuming Nations), the advent of
globalization and financialization has created a new environment for them to
compete: international financial markets. “By definition, economic and financial
globalization—in particular the expansion of trade—necessitates that
governments cede some portion of their domestic autonomy to the global
marketplace.”47 Furthermore, globalization and financialization has opened up
flows of capital, ideas, technology and people via access to international markets.
Is this just a case of the same story, but different setting? According to Bernard
Mommer it is because the exporting nations are once again losing the battle for
power due to consuming nations’ dominance of the global markets.

However,

after a closer look at the breakdown of assets in the international financial

46

Jeffrey D. Sachs, Joseph E. Stiglitz Macartan Humphreys, Escaping the Resource
Curse (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) 1.
47
Adam D. Dixon & Ashby H. B. Monk, "Rethinking the Sovereign in Sovereign Wealth
Funds," 3 August 2010. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652701>. Last Accessed: 25 April
2011.
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markets, it may be the consuming countries’ hegemony that is now being
threatened. After all, with billions of dollars in oil revenues it was only a matter
of time before oil-exporting countries realized their own potential to compete with
other major financial players.
How exactly are oil-exporting countries competing with other financial
giants? The answer lies in the creation of an entirely new set of financial actors:
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). SWFs are a missing piece to the traditional
puzzle of ‘rich countries with poor people’. They are the primary vehicles for
petrodollar recycling and allow exporting countries to successfully link to
international markets and to consuming countries. SWFs finally allow oilexporting countries to regain a sense of sovereignty by not only controlling their
own wealth, but also using it to their advantage. In conclusion, Sovereign Wealth
Funds and the countries they represent should be taken seriously as independent
sovereign players in the global financial arena.
This section will thus serve as an introduction to Sovereign Wealth Funds.
Given that SWFs are a relatively obscure concept, it is necessary to begin with a
brief overview of SWF basics. As it turns out, SWFs are a rather heterogeneous
group so while it is worthwhile to mention the different types of SWFs, the
remainder of the study will only concentrate on the Sovereign Wealth Funds
located in oil-exporting nations. The next part of this section will examine the
emergence and evolution of Middle Eastern SWFs as major players in
international finance.

15

Sovereign Wealth Fund Basics
The Term Itself:
Since it is a relatively obscure concept in general, Sovereign Wealth Funds
require a brief introduction. In fact, one reason why SWFs are a reasonably
unknown topic is because the term sovereign wealth fund did not even exist until
2005 when Andrew Rozanov of State Street Global Advisors coined the
expression in an article entitled: Who Holds the Wealth of Nations.48 Another
contributing factor to their ambiguity is that there is no real agreed upon
definition. However, if forced to hone in on a single definition the one listed in
the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices of the International Working
Group of SWFs is the most official and concise definition. As stated:
“SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or
arrangements, owned by the general government. Created by
the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs
hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial
objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies, which
include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are
commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses,
official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of
privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from
commodity exports.”49
To further clarify the above definition, the words in bold signify key defining
features of sovereign wealth funds. In sum, sovereign wealth funds are the
investment arms of governments charged with the responsibility of recycling
wealth from commodity revenues or balance of payment surpluses by investing in
48
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foreign financial assets. The asset classes range from equities (stocks), fixedincome (bonds), real estate and alternatives (derivatives & hedge funds).50
Financial Resources:
Not all sovereign wealth funds are the same. In fact, it is a rather
heterogeneous category. For simplification purposes, SWFs are typically
classified by the following two characteristics: how the funds are financed and
the function of the fund. The primary form of SWF taxonomy is according to
where their funding comes from. In terms of financial resources, SWFs can be
categorized into either a commodity fund or a non-commodity fund.
A sovereign wealth fund is a commodity fund if it receives its “financial
resources from the export of raw materials owned by the state or from
taxes/royalties related to their sale.”51 It does not come as a surprise that the most
common form of commodity SWFs receive their financing from petroleum
revenues. Thus, the majority of these funds are located in the Middle East,
specifically in the same oil-exporting nations perceived to be doomed by the
resource curse. Furthermore, commodity funds constitute the majority of SWFs
at nearly 60%.52 While the remainder of this study will be focused on this type of
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SWF it is worthwhile to mention the other type and all of the possible functions to
gain a thorough understanding of the subject.
The other major genre of SWFs is the non-commodity funds, which
receive their financial resources from “non-energy current account and other
balance-of-payments surpluses53 accumulated, as well as privatization revenues
and other fiscal proceeds.”54 This type of SWFs is most prevalent in the East
Asian countries that experienced rapid economic growth and massive balance of
trade surpluses from exporting manufactured goods. These countries set up such
funds as a way to manage their newfound wealth.
Multiple Functions:
Sovereign wealth funds can provide a wide variety of functions. After
looking at a funds’ financing the next step is to look at the function of the specific
fund. To simplify, the International Monetary Fund categorizes SWFs according
to five different purposes.
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The following table summarizes each function:

Stabilization
Funds

Savings
Funds

Reserve
Investment
Corporations

Stabilize and
insulate fiscal
policies from
fluctuations in
the prices of
raw materials

Convert nonrenewable
resources into
financial
wealth for the
benefit of
future
generations

These assets are
counted as
official
reserves, but
are managed
separately and
more
aggressively

Development
Funds

Pension
Reserve Funds

Finance socioeconomic
development
projects

Use sources
other than
normal pension
schemes in
order to ease
pension
indebtedness

Adapted from: Alberto Quadrio Curzio & Valeria Miceli, Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Complete
Guide to State-Owned Investment Funds (Harriman House LTD, 2010) 25.

It is important to note that both commodity and non-commodity sovereign
wealth funds can and often utilize a combination of the aforementioned motives.
In general, commodity SWFs tend to exhibit stabilization & savings functions
while non-commodity SWFs tend to be more aligned with reserve investment
corporations. Lastly, development and pension reserve funds have been observed
in both commodity and non-commodity funds. This study will elaborate further
on the stabilization and saving functions in the next section and discuss
development funds in the final section.
When looking at the wide variety of definitions, functions and
classifications of sovereign wealth funds it is obvious that their heterogeneity is a
large contributor to their ambiguity. For the purpose of looking at the evolution
of oil-exporting nations in the Middle East, the most relevant type of sovereign
wealth funds are commodity funds. Thus, the following section will elaborate of
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the evolution of such funds and how they fit into and extend the oil-exporting
nations’ battle for sovereignty.

Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Middle East
Now that the concept of sovereign wealth funds has been introduced, it is
time to return to the evolution of oil-exporting nations in the Middle East, insert
sovereign wealth funds into the equation and observe the effects on their struggle
for sovereignty. More specifically, will the addition of sovereign wealth funds
project the same dismal outcome as depicted in traditional literature or will it
reveal a more optimistic reality?
Emerging from the Shadows: 1953 - 2002
The creation of the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) in 1953 can be
viewed as the origins of the concept of sovereign wealth funds even though the
official terminology was not coined for another fifty-three years. KIA was
established in order to “invest surpluses derived from oil revenues so as to reduce
Kuwait’s dependence on exhaustible fossil reserves, thus lessening the effects of
price oscillation.”55 This quote captures the essence of oil-based sovereign wealth
funds. Sovereign wealth funds gave oil-exporting nations a way to convert
revenues from a non-renewable source (oil) into renewable financial assets
(primarily low risk assets like treasury bonds).
Another way to look at the rise of Middle East-based sovereign wealth
funds is by looking at the strong correlation between the rise in the price of oil
55

Curzio & Miceli 2010, 4.

20
and the number of funds established.56 The first significant price increase was
between the 1970s and 1980s when the price increased from less than $5 a barrel
to more than $35.57 This is referred to as the golden years, as previously
mentioned, when oil-exporting countries experienced a rapid accumulation of
wealth and literally had more money than they knew what to do with. Initially,
OPEC countries “expanded domestic spending by about 50% a year between
1974 and 1979, enriching the elite, but spawned white-elephant projects and
fuelled inflation of more than 15% a year.”58 As previously mentioned, since the
price of oil is set in terms of US dollars, oil-exporting countries accumulated
massive reserves of US dollars while the purchasing power of the domestic
currency was eroded.
However, when observed more closely some countries started to reverse
this inflationary trend by accumulating foreign assets signaling evidence of
foreign direct investment. “Revenues were partially spent domestically, with the
resulting push of domestic inflation. Consequently oil revenues were increasingly
allocated to foreign direct investment.”59 In short, by focusing only on the
domestic picture, the traditional literature fails to see the increasing proportion of
oil revenues that were actually flowing outside the country. By creating a vehicle
to manage foreign direct investment (SWFs), rentier states found a way seek
insulation from price volatility by diversifying their economies away from oil.
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The time to test the ability of sovereign wealth funds to help protect oilexporting nations from oil price volatility came with the price collapse in the
1980s when the price of oil fell to below $20 a barrel. Following the oil booms of
1973 and 1979 the high price of oil led to a reduction in demand and ultimately
overproduction. At first, OPEC tried cutting production in order to maintain the
high prices. Ultimately, they were unable to maintain the high price of oil and in
1986 world oil prices fell over 50%.60 “These downward price fluctuations
reinforced the belief of governments running SWFs that their income should not
depend solely on oil and natural gas.”61 Hence, more countries started creating
SWFs in order to provide stabilization during price fluctuations.
During the first phase in the rise of sovereign wealth funds, SWFs got off
to a slow start. Between 1953 and 2002, only 27 funds were established.62
Before they emerged as financial giants, they were extremely passive and
conservative in their investment strategies. For instance, their portfolios were
comprised entirely of low-risk (and thus low-yield) US government securities.
Thus, their low-profile persona during this first period kept them hidden in the
shadows.
However, the increasing globalization in the 1990s further facilitated and
encouraged investment in the international financial markets. “The globalization
of the world economy has made it dramatically easier for investors around the
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world to get in the game.”63 During the next phase in the rise of Middle Eastern
SWFs, this is exactly what they did: get in the game. Between 1998 and 2004
twelve more sovereign wealth funds were established. Considering the surge in
the price of oil from less than $20 at the end of 1998 to $40 a barrel in 2004 and
total assets held by SWFs estimated at $895 billion by 2004, it comes as no
surprise that sovereign wealth funds started to gain attention.64
In the Spotlight: 2005 - 2009
Once again, because of an increase in the price of oil from $60 a barrel in
2005 to $147 in 2008 the value of SWFs’ assets multiplied.65 Furthermore, 19
more SWFs were established during just these four years. Although the number
of sovereign wealth funds and the value of their assets increased exponentially,
their behavior remained relatively the same until 2005. Up until this point in
time, SWFs “tended to invest very conservatively, tended to invest close to home,
and tended to invest in emerging economies.”66 The year 2005 marks two
significant changes in the investment patterns of SWFs, namely in the recipients
of their investments and the size of their transactions.
As previously mentioned, all SWFs tended to invest close to home,
particularly in Asia. “In dollars, from 1994 to 2004, SWFs invested just under
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US$15 billion in Asia and less than US$1 billion elsewhere.”67 However, after
2005 SWFs shifted their investment strategies and found more opportunities to
invest their massive amounts of wealth in the United States and Europe. “In
2008, only US$3.5 billion was destined for Asia, US$11 billion to the EU, US$30
billion to the United States and US$1.5 billion to other countries.”68 The
increased emphasis on investing in Western nations took SWFs from the shadows
to front and center on the world stage.
In addition to turning their attention to the Western hemisphere, sovereign
wealth funds specifically took a keen interest in the financial sector. At first,
western institutions were hesitant to receive investments from SWFs due to their
relatively unknown nature and fear of a foreign entity controlling domestic
institutions. As noted in the Economist, “In principle everyone welcomes foreign
investment. But when the money belongs to other governments, people—
especially politicians—are not always so sure.”69 However, with the onset and
height of the financial crisis in 2007-2008, attitudes from the West towards SWFs
drastically changed most likely out of desperation. As Richard Goldberg
highlights, “meaningful pools of liquidity are out there in the form of petrodollars
and sovereign wealth funds.”70 With the West suffering from a liquidity71
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drought and SWFs swimming in an endless sea of money the solution seemed
obvious. As a result, “from ‘barbarians’ they became lenders of last resort for the
shaky financial sector.”72
The numerous high profile deals between SWFs and major Western
financial institutions signifies the successful evolution of SWFs from relatively
unknown entities to major players in the world of international finance. More
important, after years of struggling to emerge from the shadow and dominance of
the West, the rise of sovereign wealth funds as major financial players has given
oil-exporting nations a new found sense of sovereignty and bargaining power.
Due to the heterogeneous nature of SWFs, it is necessary to further narrow our
focus in order to better assess the role of oil-exporting sovereign wealth funds.
Hence, the next section will take a closer look at the three most prominent SWFs
in the Middle East in terms of their participation in global financial markets.
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SECTION 3
The Major Players in International Financial Markets
“Around 45% of SWFs came from oil rich countries at the end of 2007. This is a
clear indication of the magnitude and the financial power of the GCC (Gulf
Corporation council) originated SWF. Despite the relatively smaller GDPs and
economies compared to the industrialized nations, GCC has an extensive
financial power.”73
On May 25th 1981, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates came together to form the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC)
in order to foster cooperation and unity among Member States.74 Between 20042007, the countries constituting the GCC collectively invested approximately
$140 billion overseas.75 To put this number into perspective, it is estimated that
GCC originated SWFs have assets ranging between US$980 billion and
US$1,478 billion.76 These impressive numbers, coupled with the numerous high
profile investments in Western financial institutions, signified the transition of
Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds from relatively unknown entities to
frontrunners in the global financial markets.
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While GCC sovereign wealth funds were extremely active and successful
in 2007, they started to suffer along with the rest of the financial world with the
onset of the financial crisis at the end of the year. “GCC countries suffered
during the 2007-2009 crisis because of the fall in the price of oil, the tightening of
international credit conditions, the collapse of the real estate market and the
increased vulnerability of domestic banks.”77 Just as the failure of many US
financial institutions during the financial crisis spurred debate and harsh critique
of the banking industry, the losses incurred by GCC SWFs hurled them into a
very similar situation.
This section will present a more in-depth look at the main GCC sovereign
wealth funds and their participation in global financial markets. While the
previous section served as a brief introduction to SWFs, in order to asses the
potential impact of the funds on global financial markets three of the key GCC
SWFs will be examined in detail. The three key GCC sovereign wealth funds we
will look at are: The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA - the oldest SWF), The
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA - the largest SWFs), and The Qatar
Investment Authority (QIA - the new comer). The next part of this section will
look at both sides of the debate concerning SWFs’ role and impact on global
financial markets as well as the funds’ response.
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Case Studies of the Main Middle Eastern SWFs
The following case study will provide a more detailed picture of the inner
workings of the three main GCC sovereign wealth funds targeting international
markets. For each of the three funds the following aspects will be taken under
consideration: history of the fund, mission statement & objectives, investment
strategy & portfolio characteristics, and high profile transactions.

Kuwait Investment Authority: The Oldest SWF
History
Kuwait was the first country to realize the importance of transforming oil
wealth from a depleting asset into renewable financial assets. In 1953 the Kuwait
Investment Board was created to fulfill this goal. Although the actual SWF, the
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), was not created until 1982, the investment
board managed the assets of Kuwait in the same fashion as a sovereign wealth
fund. Hence, this is why KIA is considered the oldest sovereign wealth fund.78
Today, KIA is comprised of two main funds: the General Reserve Fund
(GRF) and the Future Generations Fund (FGF).79 While the General Reserve
Fund is the recipient of state oil revenues, the Fund for Future Generations is only
78
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to be touched in the event of a state emergency. “The government invests 10% of
all state revenues, including 10% of the income earned by the General Reserve
Fund, every year into the Fund for Future Generations.”80 Overall, KIA acts as
an asset manager and the funds belong to the state. The estimated value of KIA’s
assets under management is US$295 billion.81
Mission
KIA’s mission as stated by managing director, Mr. Bader M. Al Sa’ad, is
“to achieve a long term investment return on the financial reserves entrusted by
the State of Kuwait to the Kuwait Investment Authority by providing an
alternative to oil reserves, which would enable Kuwait’s future generations to face
the uncertainties ahead with greater confidence.” 82
Investment Strategy
KIA has historically been a very conservative investor, preferring low risk
US debt securities—Treasury bills, notes and bonds—to all other asset classes.
The fund’s investment strategy remained mostly unchanged until 2004 when
Bader al Sa’ad took over as managing director. He discovered many
comparisons between KIA and Ivy League endowment funds, mainly that they
both had long-term horizons and conservative methods except that the latter was
experiencing higher rate of returns. The difference was that the endowment funds
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were investing in real estate, private equity83, hedge funds and emerging markets
while KIA was not.84 Hence, KIA increased its portfolio allocations in equities,
“alternative instruments (private equity, hedge funds and derivatives) and its
exposure to emerging markets, at the same time reducing US debt securities.”85
KIA’s current portfolio allocation is 55-65% equities, 8-12% bonds, 8-12% real
estate and alternative assets and cash at 3-7%.86
KIA also pursues a strategy of diversifying investments geographically. It
is estimated that KIA aims to invest 76-86% equally between the United States
and Europe, 13-17% in Asia and Japan and 4-6% in emerging markets.87
Furthermore, about 50% of its investments are managed by external fund
managers in order to remain passive investors and avoid taking too large of a
controlling stake in a company.88 Another aspect supporting their passive
approach to investing is that they are not allowed to use leverage - the practice of
borrowing money to raise additional capital.89
High Profile Transactions
Evidence of the strength and resiliency of KIA is exemplified by two of
its most prominent assets: British Petroleum and Daimler AG, the German car
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manufacturer. KIA’s 7.1% stake in Daimler AG dates back to 1969 and even
when the company suffered losses due to the failed acquisition of Chrysler in
1998, KIA maintained its stake in the company.90 Furthermore, in response to the
British Prime Minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher’s call for privatization in
the late 1980s, KIA increased its stake in BP to 22%.91 However, this sparked
great concern regarding KIA’s motives and although KIA asserted that it would
not to play a controlling role in BP it agreed to reduce its stake to 3.3%. KIA’s
investment in Daimler AG demonstrates its ability to maintain long-term
investments and its willingness to appease political pressures is evident in the case
of BP.
Now we turn to some of KIA’s more recent investments. As two of the
largest US financial institutions, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, were rapidly being
engulfed by the financial crisis, they desperately sought liquidity injections to stay
afloat. Where did they turn? They went to sovereign wealth funds like the
Kuwait Investment Authority. In January 2008, KIA invested nearly $3 billion in
Citigroup and $2 billion into Merrill Lynch prior to Merrill’s takeover by Bank of
America.92 KIA was expected to wait for its preferred shares93 to convert94 into
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common stock in accordance with their long-term passive strategy. However, in
December of 2009, less than two years after the deal was brokered, KIA decided
to sell its stake in Citigroup for about $4.1 billion, resulting in a profit of $1.1
billion.95 Along with the profit came attention from the media, politicians and
market experts.
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority: The Largest SWF
History
After the rise in oil prices in 1970s, in 1976 Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al
Nahyan replaced a part of Abu Dhabi’s department of finance known as the
Financial Investments Board with the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA),
in an effort to preserve the future wealth of Abu Dhabi. Seeing as the fund is an
oil-based commodity fund, it receives its financial resources from dividends
transferred by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) into the fund:
70% of any budget surplus.
The value of the fund’s assets has been estimated to be between US$282
billion and US$627 billion.96 As is the case with most sovereign wealth funds, it
is difficult to give an exact estimate of the fund’s assets because the fund does not
disclose this information to the public. However, ADIA took a step towards
greater transparency last year when they published their first ever-annual review.
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Although it does not contain the overall size of its holdings or specific balance
sheet details, it does provide helpful insight in terms of their general investment
strategy.
Mission
As stated in ADIA’s 2009 annual review, “The Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority is a globally-diversified investment institution whose sole mission is to
invest funds on behalf of the Government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi to make
available the necessary financial resources to secure and maintain the future
welfare of the Emirate.”97
Investment Strategy
ADIA carries out this mission by maintaining a diversified portfolio across
geographies, sectors and asset classes including public listed equities, fixed
income, real estate, and private equity. As stated in their 2009 annual review,
“ADIA’s investment strategy involves looking beyond individual economic
cycles and focusing on strategies aimed at capturing secular trends and
outperforming the market over the long term.”98 Furthermore, ADIA’s decisions
are based purely on its economic objectives of delivering sustained long-term
financial returns and ADIA does not seek active management of the companies it
invests in.99
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ADIA’s mission and general investment strategy as stated above has
remained relatively unchanged for over thirty years and has greatly attributed to
its success and reputation as the largest and most renowned sovereign wealth fund
in the world. When ADIA was first established in 1976, it was primarily focused
on equities and bonds, treasury, finance and administration, real estate and local
and regional investments.100 Up until the early 1990s the fund’s investment
strategy was vigilant and conservative meaning that they invested primarily in
low-risk liquid assets like treasury bills and avoided high profile investments.
Eager to seek out higher returns, ADIA started to pursue a more
aggressive approach by diversifying across asset classes. As a result, by 2000
ADIA aimed for a portfolio of: stocks in developed markets (45-55%); stocks in
emerging markets (8-12%); small-cap stocks101 (1-4%); government bonds (1218%); corporate and other bonds (4-8%); Alternative investments (5-10%); real
estate (5-10%); private equity (2-8%); infrastructure (0-4%); and cash (0-5%).102
Furthermore, ADIA also continued to diversify the geographic distribution of
their investments: 35-50% in North America, 25-35% in Europe, 15-25% in
emerging markets and 10-20% in developed Asia.103
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High Profile Transactions
Even with a more diverse portfolio, ADIA’s low profile investment
strategy remained under the radar until November 2007 when ADIA emerged to
the public by purchasing 4.9% of Citigroup, the failing Wall Street Bank, for an
estimated $7.5 billion. As one of the largest deals ever pursued by a sovereign
wealth fund, this can be considered the catalyst that catapulted SWFs into the
spotlight. The deal specified that sometime between March 2010 and September
2010 ADIA would convert its shares into common stock at a price between
$31.83 and $37.24 with an annual coupon104 of 11%.105 However, not
everything went according to plan and Citigroup stock plummeted to a low of
3.41 per share. Unlike KIA, ADIA did not have the option to convert from
preferred to common stock at any time it pleases to cut its losses. Hence, ADIA is
now looking at up to a $4.8 billion paper loss106 when it is forced to convert to
shares at a price almost 10 times higher than its current value. Although KIA
ended up with a profitable deal with Citigroup, this potential loss has also hurled
ADIA into the spotlight right next to KIA.
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Qatar Investment Authority: The New Comer
History
Out of the three major funds discussed, the Qatar Investment Authority is
the most recent addition to the group of GCC sovereign wealth funds. QIA was
founded by the Qatari Government in 2005 and headed by the country’s prime
minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim as-Thani. “Qatar has huge gas reserves as
much as one third of the world’s total gas reserves lies within its territory.”107
The Prime Minister recognized the nation’s rapid accumulation of wealth and
made it a priority to preserve these funds for future generations. The fund is
currently estimated to manage US$70 billion dollars,108 which may appear small
in comparison to KIA and ADIA, however QIA is making up for lost time with a
series of high profile investments.
Mission
QIA’s mission, as defined on the company website, is to “secure the future
prosperity of its people by building up a diversified asset base to complement its
wealth of natural resources.”109 With one of its main goals being economic
diversification, the fund is looking to further develop the country’s infrastructure,
education and health facilities. This strong emphasis on economic diversification
makes QIA stand out a bit from more traditional SWFs like ADIA and KIA and
has led to a slightly different investment strategy as well.
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Investment Strategy
QIA’s general investment strategy is similar to that of KIA’s and ADIA’s
in that it also carries out its mission by building a strong global portfolio
diversified across asset classes and geographies. “Although the QIA was formed
as recently as 2005, it has already built up a strong track record of diversified
investments, ranging from listed securities, property, alternative assets and private
equity as well as local strategic sectors.”110 Although exact percentage breakdown
of QIA’s portfolio is not available to the public, the fund mainly invests in
equities, fixed income, private equity and direct investment in order to diversify
its oil and natural gas wealth. Falling in line with KIA and ADIA, QIA invests all
around the world with investments in The United States, Europe and Asia.
Finally, QIA is also driven by strict commercial and financial motives in order to
secure its reputation as a world-class financial investor.
High Profile Transactions
While KIA and ADIA started off as extremely passive and conservative
investors and gradually expanded their appetite for risk, QIA came out of the gate
in full force. It has gained significant attention in such a short time span by
pursuing several high profile deals simultaneously. The first mega deal that
brought QIA into the spotlight came only two years after their creation with the
purchase of a 20% stake in the London Stock Exchange for US$2 billion dollars
in September 2007.
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A statement from QIA states:
This is a key investment for Qatar Holding and QIA, and
one that it intends to hold for the long term. The QIA
group sees itself as a shareholder that will provide stability
and support for the Board’s strategy of developing further
its business and thereby reinforce the City of London’s
position as the world’s top global capital market.111
The next flashy deal came in 2008 when Barclays, a British bank suffering
from losses, decided to seek new funds by issuing $8.9 billion of new shares.
QIA purchased the new shares along with other institutional investors. In a
similar fashion to KIA, QIA later decided to sell a $2.1 billion stake in the British
bank and come out with a profit around $985 million.112 Ironically, QIA made a
quick turn around with this profit and channeled it into a US$3.7 billion
investment in the British supermarket chain, Sainsbury. With so many high
profile deals on the table, it is evident that QIA is pursuing a more aggressive
investment strategy than its predecessors with hopes of becoming just as
successful.
Traditional vs. Progressive Sovereign Wealth Funds
With the sharp increases in oil prices in the 1970’s and again in the early
2000’s two generations of sovereign wealth funds have emerged. The group of
SWFs established in the 1970s, including KIA and ADIA, are considered to be
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traditional SWFs in that they adhere to a conservative, passive and relatively low
profile investment strategy. In contrast, the second generation of SWFs, like QIA,
have emerged full force with a higher preference for risk and flashy investments.
A report by the consulting firm, Monitor, observed this phenomenon: “These new
funds have tended to take a more active investment approach, borrowing to invest
in high-profile assets, rather than relying on their own capital accumulations.”113
This is otherwise known as leverage, a practice that traditional sovereign wealth
funds steer away from due to the higher exposure to risk. The trend of moving
from a conservative to an aggressive position in the markets was not limited to
sovereign wealth funds. In fact, the increasing financialization between 1990s
and 2000s led to an overall increase in the appetite for risk for all investors. This
behavior is especially typical during a period of economic boom.
When comparing the two traditional sovereign wealth funds, KIA and
ADIA are roughly 90% identical.114 They both pursue long-term, relatively
conservative approaches seeking high returns, but without directly investing in
companies and without seeking controlling stakes or board representation in a
company. They both make their investments by using external account managers.
One slight difference is that KIA prefers to invest in funds of hedge funds while
ADIA typically invests directly in hedge funds. In contrast, newer funds are
seeking to take a more active and aggressive approach by making large
investments directly in high profile companies with the hope of achieving even
higher returns.
113
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Regardless of the type of investment strategy, what has become evident is
that both traditional and newer sovereign wealth funds have acquired a preference
for high profile investments in major Western companies, especially financially
troubled ones. Such investments have catapulted SWFs from the shadows and
into the public spotlight and consequently ignited a debate regarding their role and
impact on global financial markets. The next section will take a closer look at
both sides of this heated debate, specifically whether or not sovereign wealth
funds are a stabilizing or destabilizing force on the international financial markets.
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SECTION 4
Potential Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial
Markets

Sovereign wealth funds’ emergence as major financial players did not
progress gradually over their fifty plus years of existence, rather this phenomenon
has come into fruition quite rapidly only over the past decade. Although SWFs
started to engage and participate in the global financial markets in the early 2000s,
it was not until the onset of the financial crisis that their prowess was actually
recognized:
During 2007-2008, called upon by Western governments
and institutions, they initially helped both their public
image and the struggling economies of Western nations
by contributing to recapitalize their crisis-stricken banks
and by investing in important but troubled financial
companies.115
The ability of a foreign entity to rescue some of the most prominent
Western financial institutions that could not save themselves, secured SWFs a
position at the table of the major financial players of the world. At the same time,
it also caught the attention of Western governments, media and the general public
and consequently ignited a debate regarding the impact of sovereign wealth funds
on global financial markets. More specifically, the debate boils down to the
question of whether or not sovereign wealth funds act as a stabilizing force or
destabilizing force on international markets. This section will explore both sides
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of the debate, the general consensus and finally the reactions of sovereign wealth
funds.
Sovereign Wealth Funds as Stabilizing Forces
Generally speaking, financial markets and economies experience periods
of stability intertwined with phases of booms and busts. Over the past century we
have seen an example of this phenomenon with a period of general stability from
1933 - 1973 and the economic boom in the mid 1990s-mid 2000’s followed by the
onset of the global financial crisis in 2007. The evident cyclical nature of the
financial markets creates an opportunity for the major market players to decide
how they want to react.
Typically, financial actors practice pro-cyclical behavior meaning that
when times are good, they like to ride it out and get the most out of the boom as
they can. For instance, when interest rates rise in a boom, banks more often than
not decrease excess reserves in order to turn the reserves into profitable assets by
extending more loans or making further investments. In terms of the recent
financial crisis, the over eagerness of banks to extend loans was great news for
those who needed credit the most, but who were the least likely to get it. “Readily
available credit enabled many consumers with poor credit scores to obtain
mortgages, classified as “subprime” because they were considered to be in the
riskiest category of loans.”116 Most of these loans were adjustable rate
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mortgages117 (ARMs) because with the steadily increasing housing prices, ARMs
gave subprime borrowers the incentive to refinance at more attractive rates.
However, as housing prices started to decline in 2006 these subprime borrowers
were unable to repay their loans to the banks and many major providers of
subprime loans started to collapse because they did not have enough reserves to
cover the losses.
In addition, the subprime crisis also highlighted the dangers of another
financial practice known as securitization.118 In the case of subprime mortgages,
securitization was the practice whereby after the banks issued a mortgage they
would turn around, repackage it and sell it as a mortgage-backed security.
Essentially, securitization allows for a bank to transform a liability into a
moneymaking asset. Once these original sub-prime mortgages started to default,
investors around the world started to question the stability of the US financial
system and their mortgage-backed investments and started to retreat. As a result,
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credit started to dry up, banks were no longer able to extend loans and the system
as a whole was in desperate need of liquidity. Where did troubled banks and
institutions find massive pools of liquidity when they were in need? Sovereign
wealth funds.
Anti-Cyclical Behavior
One of the key differences between sovereign wealth funds and other
major investment vehicles, and the reason why they were able to rescue failing
western institutions, boils down to their unique investment strategy. “SWFs are
recognized as contributing to the stability of the financial system due to their
long-term horizons, the greater diversification of their portfolios, their average
low level of indebtedness and the absence of liquidity risks.”119 Unlike Western
banks that are more focused on making a profit based on short-term trends, SWFs
are able to withstand crises because they are more interested in long-term trends
rather than cycles of booms and busts. As a matter of practice, SWFs invest in all
types of asset classes as well as geographic locations, so if one asset class goes
bust (like subprime mortgages) the other assets will be able to insulate the fund.
Furthermore, as demonstrated by KIA and ADIA, SWFs typically do not engage
in leveraging their assets, unlike the overleveraged banks in the US and thus do
not have to worry about an absence of liquidity.
All of the aforementioned elements of SWFs’ unique investment strategy
have allowed sovereign wealth funds to inherently engage in anti-cyclical
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behavior. Meaning that, “they are well placed to withstand market pressures in
times of crisis, contribute to stabilizing financial markets and provide new sources
of liquidity for global capital markets.”120 SWFs are anti-cyclical in this way
because in times of crisis, when the majority of financial markets are sucked dry
of credit and liquidity, SWFs are still able and willing to invest in these troubled
institutions, rather than hibernating and waiting for a boom period to make a
move.
This exact behavior was exhibited in 2008 when SWFs made capital
injections into failing Western banks, “providing sought-after liquidity and
contributing to easing financial market turmoil.”121 Furthermore, as Richard
Goldberg asserts it in his book, The Battle for Wall Street, “sovereign wealth
funds are international capital dealers-open for business, open to all takers.”122
The majority of Western financial institutions do not practice the same investment
strategies as SWFs and are thus unable to demonstrate anti-cyclical behavior. In
retrospect of the financial crisis, the inherent anti-cyclical nature of sovereign
wealth funds has bestowed upon them the ability to be strong stabilizing forces in
the global financial markets.
Mutual Interdependence
Thanks to their anti-cyclical role in global markets, sovereign wealth
funds were able to provide liquidity to Western institutions on the verge of failure
120
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during the recent financial crisis. However, sovereign wealth funds did not make
these investments as a form of charity. In fact, the only reason why they made the
investments in the first place was because they saw an opportunity to potentially
make a profit in the long run. KIA and QIA’s profitable returns on their
investments in Citigroup and Barclays respectively, can be viewed as evidence of
this claim. This leads to a very important aspect of SWFs’ beneficial role in
international finance, namely mutual interdependence.

“Not only do Western

countries need the liquidity of SWFs, as proven by the financial crisis, but SWFs
also need Western countries to keep their markets open to foreign investment.”123
This sense of mutual interdependence creates an environment where if one
side turns its back on the other, it is a lose lose situation for all. Hence, both
Western institutions and GCC sovereign wealth funds have an incentive to
continue to work together and engage in cross border investments. Not only can
both gain financially speaking, but this interdependence creates a spillover effect
into the political arena as well. “SWFs consolidate peaceful relations between
nations by facilitating interdependence between home and recipient
countries…investment across borders binds us together by creating actors with
much to lose from political tension.”124 Thus, not only do sovereign wealth funds
contribute to stability in the global financial markets, but by doing so they also
promote stability in terms of international relations and diplomacy. This point is
of particular relevance in terms of the importance of fostering healthier and
stronger ties between the Western world and the Arab world.
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Sovereign Wealth Funds as Destabilizing Agents
Although GCC sovereign wealth funds were initially welcomed and
praised as lenders of last resort during the 2007-2008 credit crunch,125 the very
fact that they are the investment arms of foreign governments ignited a series of
concerns. “When you have private investors who are basically disciplined by the
market, that’s a different kind of investment than if you have SWFs that are
basically an arm of a government.”126 Hence, it does not come as a surprise that
the concerns expressed regarding the impact of sovereign wealth funds on global
financial markets are more political fears rather than financial.
Threat of Political Motivations
The main reasons for concern, stem primarily from the fact that they are a
government entity rather than a private financial institution, they originate in
regions like the Middle East which typically represent unstable, autocratic and
undemocratic regimes, and that there is very little published to the public
regarding their balance sheet and investment strategies. All of the above
seemingly worrisome characteristics of GCC sovereign wealth funds have
culminated into a single concern with regards to the overall motives of SWFs.
Specifically, the main concern for sovereign wealth funds critics is the degree to
which SWFs are politically motivated rather than financially.
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One of the main political concerns is that sovereign wealth funds could
potentially take advantage of the sheer size and value of their financial resources
by purchasing larger stakes in Western companies, ultimately trying to take full
control of the companies they invest in. More specifically, “critics worry about
SWFs accumulating too large a stake in US financial interests.”127 While the U.S.
indeed wanted and needed help from GCC SWFs in order to keep key financial
institutions afloat, they started to panic and wonder how much foreign investment
is too much?
Along the same lines, the next worry regarding the motives of GCC
sovereign wealth funds is the fear that they might try to target strategic industries
for political reasons. The main industries of concern are advanced technology,
energy and defense. “SWFs blur the line between public and private
investment…Western nations worry about the security implications of foreign
countries, including Persian Gulf states, acquiring important positions in key
industries and companies.”128 This is a legitimate concern considering the
potentially disastrous result if foreign governments were to use their sovereign
wealth funds to acquire knowledge of sensitive sectors of the US economy.
Sovereign Wealth Funds’ Response to Concerns
With the onset of globalization, “developing countries were urged to open
up their economies and financial system to catch up with the Western world.”129
For years the West was the main champion and supporter of promoting free trade
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and maintaining open economies. Did the West mean to say that it welcomes free
trade and investment, but only from other Western democratic nations?
After sovereign wealth funds came to the rescue of failing Western
financial institutions, they were not necessarily expecting praise or gratitude, but
they certainly were not expecting to receive so much political backlash. At the
same time, the West was not anticipating the emergence of oil-exporting nations
as financial giants. “Since the early 2000s western policy makers and the general
public have been surprised by the emergence of financial powerhouses from oil
exporters, while these investors have been shocked by the antagonistic reception
they have received in the US and some European countries.”130
In general, “SWF executives argue that a close examination of their track
records demonstrates their abstention from political interference and that their
investments are driven by commercial interests.”131 Specifically, Muhammad alJasser of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency explains that simply because of the
countries they represent “it is like the SWFs are guilty until proven innocent.”132
Similarly, the head of the Kuwait Investment Authority, Bader al-Saad exclaims,
“Why is everybody after sovereign wealth funds? What have they done? Did they
misbehave in any country where they invested in?... All they are talking about is a
fear of something that did not happen and will not happen.”133 Lastly, the CEO of
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Co., Talal al-Zain, echoed his fellow executives’
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sentiments saying, “I hope the hype about the sovereign wealth funds doesn’t
close the market, because that would be a shame.”134
Reality of the Debate
In reality, the fear that sovereign wealth funds are a destabilizing force on
international financial markets has been greatly exaggerated in public debate, to
the point where the concerns have increasingly overshadowed the clear and
evident stabilizing role of SWFs. Furthermore, although the fears sound serious
and could potentially be a reason for concern, at this point there is not nearly
enough evidence to support the claim that SWFs are destabilizing forces on global
financial markets.
On the contrary, the evidence clearly sways in favor of the argument that
sovereign wealth funds contribute to the stability of the financial system. In fact,
it is very difficult to identify any occasion where a SWF took advantage of their
power for political gain in a host country. Furthermore, the majority of sovereign
wealth funds only take minority stakes in a company and do not seek board
representation. In short, “these funds are looking for investments, not control.”135
This is inherent in the overall fact that sovereign wealth funds behave as ‘rational’
investors, seeking to maximize returns while minimizing risk.
While the argument claiming that sovereign wealth funds are politically
motivated turns out to be founded upon fear itself rather than evidence, there is
one real potential risk looming in the debate. The real risk is the rise of
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protectionist136 measures as a result of the xenophobic attitudes of the west.
“SWFs are concerned that the tight scrutiny of their activities could fuel
sentiments of economic nationalism and trigger protectionist measures against the
free flow of capital.”137
Although the threat of protectionist policies is a concern for SWFs,
paradoxically it would be the West who would be hurt the most by such measures.
“Such fear is forcing the SWFs to be invested in other countries and in non-US
firms, thereby protecting and improving some other countries’ way of life at the
expense of ours.”138 Furthermore, “by making itself an anti-Arab bastion, the US
is cutting itself off from better integration into the world economy and ultimately
giving up market share for its goods and services to its competitors.139
In fact, in response to the surge of xenophobic attitudes in the West,
sovereign wealth funds have already started to reassess their investment
strategies. More and more, SWFs are decreasing their investments in the West
and increasing investments in emerging markets, like Asia, where they can
capitalize on much higher growth rates and enjoy a welcoming investment
environment. Unfortunately, in reality, the potential fear the West should really
be concerned about is that the next time they find themselves in dire need of
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liquidity, just as they did during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, their sovereign
wealth fund friends might not be as eager to bail them out. One can only imagine
the actual destabilizing effects this would have on international financial markets.
Up to this point, we have discussed the basic characteristics of sovereign
wealth funds, followed by an in-depth case study of three main Middle Eastern
SWFs and explored both sides of the debate regarding their potential impact on
international financial markets. After broadening the scope to include the world
of global finance we can now return to the traditional literature on oil-exporting
nations and readdress the arguments in light of this new perspective. Thus, in the
next section we will turn our attention from international financial markets back
towards the domestic economies of SWFs’ home countries.
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SECTION 5
Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Regional and Domestic
Economies
The main objectives of the Middle Eastern SWFs are to secure long-term wealth
for future generations, generate funds necessary for future pension and
healthcare liabilities, and minimize their countries’ reliance on oil income.
However, the funds also face domestic political pressures to support local
economies and achieve short- term returns. This pressure has become more
pronounced in the wake of the global financial crisis, which broke out in 2008.140
Between 2005-2008, the rise of GCC sovereign wealth funds as major
players in international finance as well as the numerous high profile deals pursued
attracted an immense amount of attention and critique. While the initial debate
focused primarily on the impact of sovereign wealth funds on global financial
markets, another debate was unfolding as a result of the losses incurred by SWFs
during the financial crisis. The fact that SWFs and their home economies suffered
as a result of the global financial crisis proved that despite their massive wealth
and ability to bail out Western institutions, they were not invincible and
completely immune to global recessions. As a result, SWFs faced a new internal
pressure to aid their domestic economies: “Why were the SWF’s available to
rescue Western Banks but not to invest strategically at home?”141
SWFs have not been forced to rethink their strategies by the
losses they have sustained or a lack of attractive opportunities.
Rather they have been constrained by economic and political
factors, which have forced many funds to look to investing at
home to help develop and diversify, or to bail out and support
flagging local financial sectors and stock markets.142
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After 2008, in response to both the external criticism and domestic pressures
GCC sovereign wealth funds were forced to rethink their strategies, primarily in a
geographic sense. In response to the external pressures and protectionist
sentiments from the West, we have already seen and continue to see GCC SWFs
investing more and more in emerging markets, like Asia, where they can earn a
higher rate of return and have their investments welcomed. In addition, in
response to the mounting domestic pressures SWFs had to take into account the
long-term development needs of their own countries and regions. Either
traditional SWFs made adjustments to include domestic considerations or new
SWFs were created as sovereign development funds with the primary focus of
domestic development.
The high oil prices experienced in the 1970s and between 2002-2008 not
only generated massive revenues for GCC countries, but also generated a familiar
and inevitable question: to what extent will these oil revenues be used to address
and alleviate the GCCs’ economic setbacks? While the answer to this question
varies from country to country, a few common features have historically
characterized the GCC economies. Namely, a high dependency on oil, high
reliance on expatriate labor, a young and rapidly expanding national labor force
and dominant public sector overshadowing a weak private sector.143 This section
will begin by providing an overview of the traditional long-term economic
development goals aimed at addressing the aforementioned concerns. This will
be followed by an examination of the current economic landscape in three of the
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main GCC oil-exporting countries: Kuwait, Qatar and UAE. Finally, this section
will conclude with a closer look at the extent to which two traditional funds (KIA
& QIA) and one new sovereign development fund (Mubadala) are addressing
these long-term development goals and domestic pressures.

Long-Term Development Goals of GCC Economies
While the GCC economies have experienced common setbacks over the
years, such as the dependence on oil, an underdeveloped private sector and
overreliance on foreign workers, they also face a common set of long-term goals
to potentially overcome the aforementioned challenges. The primary long-term
economic goals are economic diversification away from oil, the expansion of the
non-oil private sector and the attraction of strategic foreign direct investments.
Economic Diversification
The primary overarching long-term development goal for all oil-exporting
nations is economic diversification. Once oil was discovered, GCC countries
became completely dependent upon oil, with petroleum contributing to well over
half of GDP144 and to nearly all of the government revenues (as previously
discussed, this is otherwise known as a rentier state). As is often the case, it is
riskier to put all of your eggs in one basket rather than spread out across multiple
baskets. This is especially true when the resource a country’s economy depends
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on is non-renewable and the price is determined in international markets.
“Because of the boom-and bust- cycles associated with many world commodity
markets, the rent-producing sector can be a highly unreliable source.”145 Hence,
the extreme volatility of oil prices makes it a very risky commodity to depend
upon.
The aforementioned risks facing oil-based economies gave GCC countries
the desire to find ways to “extend economic life beyond finite oil resources.”146
In other words, GCC countries soon realized the strong necessity to diversify their
economies away from oil. There are two main ways to diversify an economy.
The first method is the diversification of income in an effort to insulate a country
from volatility and risk. This has been accomplished primarily by investing
abroad via sovereign wealth funds. Income diversification promotes fiscal
stability by insuring that a country generates revenue from a wide variety of
activities rather than relying on a single source. This is the same reason why
investors pursue a diversified portfolio, because if one asset suffers the other
assets act as a buffer and keep the investors afloat.
The second method of economic diversification is the diversification of
production. This is primarily accomplished by investing domestically in a
country. While income diversification promotes fiscal stability, production
diversification aims to promote social stability by targeting the labor markets.
The primary consequence of oil-exporting nations’ lack of economic diversity is
massive domestic unemployment. Over the past thirty years, the Arab region has
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seen improvements in terms of basic economic benchmarks such as a reduction in
infant mortality coupled with a slight decrease in the fertility rates. “The result is
a rapidly expanding population, with vast numbers of young people.”147 The
problem is that “in order to provide enough jobs for the young, their economies
would have to grow at rates similar to those of China and India, and so far they
haven’t.”148 Thus, even though many Arab countries have expanded their highereducation system to accommodate their growing young population, the problem is
that there are simply not enough jobs to employ them after graduation. “Unlike in
the United States and other Western countries, the unemployment rate increases
with the level of educational attainment.” 149
Private Sector Expansion
Furthermore, the citizens who are lucky enough to be employed work
predominantly in the public sector. The private sector is relatively
underdeveloped and is heavily dominated by foreign workers, all further
contributing to high levels of domestic unemployment. “Expatriate workers now
account in most GCC countries for about three-fourths of the total workforce.
These countries have maintained an open-door policy to attract expatriate
labor.”150 Hence, the rapidly expanding local workforce coupled with limited
employment opportunities in the private sector has generated massive amounts of
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unemployment. Therefore, the main long-term development goal for oilexporting nations should be to reduce unemployment by focusing on expanding
and developing a strong private sector, specifically labor-intensive manufacturing
and service sectors. More specifically, the emphasis should be placed on
developing so called strategic sectors like “agriculture, food processing, the water
sector, education, health care and renewable energy.”151 These are all industries
that produce social benefits to the greater population and can lead to a reduction
in a wide variety of economic indicators like poverty, disease, illiteracy and
unemployment.
Attract Foreign Direct Investment
Lastly, one of the key goals for developing economies is to attract foreign
direct investment. Once the basic foundation of an economy has been developed
or in this case once an economy has started to diversify its production, it can start
to attract foreign direct investment to further develop the domestic economy.
Along with the much-needed inflow of foreign capital and funding, some of the
greatest byproducts of foreign direct investment include “technology spillovers,
assists human capital formation, contributes to international trade integration,
helps create a more competitive business environment and enhances enterprise
development…all of these contribute to higher economic growth.”152 In
conclusion, only by pursuing the dual goals of income and production
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diversification can GCC countries truly achieve economic diversification and
ultimately economic growth.

Current Economic Landscape &
GCC SWF Responses to Domestic Pressures
On the surface, the boom in oil prices from 2002 to 2008 greatly
strengthened and rejuvenated the GCC economies on a macro level. For the six
GCC countries, “real gross domestic product (GDP) growth reached an average of
8 percent a year over the 2002–2007 period while average GDP per capita across
the six countries grew about 32%.”153 While these are indeed impressive measures
of economic growth, they tell us very little about the progress, or lack thereof,
GCC countries have made in addressing their long-term development goals. The
following section will examine the current economic situation, beyond economic
growth indicators, for Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, it
will also assess the role each country’s sovereign wealth fund is playing in
addressing the long-term goals.

Kuwait
As a country slightly smaller than the state of New Jersey, Kuwait has
managed to compensate for its small geographic size in lieu of its enormous oilbased wealth. Before the discovery of oil in 1938, Kuwait’s economy was based
almost entirely on the pearling industry.154 From the discovery of oil onward and
even up to present day, the economy of Kuwait is extremely dependent upon oil.
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With the possession of about 9% of world oil reserves, “petroleum accounts for
nearly half of GDP, 95% of export revenues and 95% of government income.”155
Hence, the stability and strength of the domestic economy remains closely linked
with world oil prices.
The large oil revenues have allowed Kuwait to enjoy the 8th highest GDP
per capita in the world, however growth in per capita income is only a measure of
economic growth, not a measure of economic development. As a result, “Kuwait
has done little to diversify its economy.”156 In fact, because Kuwait has very
limited industry outside of oil it is forced to import almost all agriculture and
manufactured goods. Furthermore, around 60% of the labor force is comprised of
non-Kuwaitis, contributing to an unemployment rate of around 2.2%. While an
unemployment rate of 2.2% is not considered high, the fact that the majority of
the labor force is still comprised of foreign workers is still a cause for concern.
Despite having an extremely young and literate population (94.4%), Kuwait does
not have the industry diversification or investment in human capital to make use
of its population’s potential.
The main setback for the Kuwaiti economy is the extremely
underdeveloped private sector. “The total number of private enterprises is around
25000, of which 2700 or about 1% has around 10 employees, 60% have less than
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30 and 15% have less than 50 employees.”157 Furthermore, the majority of these
small private enterprises are concentrated in the tourism, construction and
financial services industries. Lastly, only around 5% of Kuwaitis are employed in
the private sector as compared to 95% in the public sector.158
The Kuwaiti government has recognized the urgent need for economic
diversification and thus recently passed an economic development plan “that
pledges to spend up to $130 billion in five years to diversify the economy away
from oil, attract more investment, and boost private sector participation in the
economy.”159 While this plan appears to encompass the general long-term
development goals facing most oil-exporting countries, only time will tell if the
plan is implemented to the full extent. If it is, the benefits the plan could bring to
Kuwait’s economy are undeniable.

Kuwait Investment Authority
The official self-stated role of KIA in the local economy is as follows:160
•

•
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Promotes and supports institutionalization of the market by
setting up funds and companies to promote and finance local
business, and participates in the launching of local
investments with feasible economic returns
Helps develop the role of local financial companies by giving
them the opportunity to manage some of their investments
locally and abroad
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•
•
•

Maintains the private sector’s regeneration through
privatization programs that KIA is committed to undertake
Provides liquidity to the State’s Treasury when needed
As detailed in the role of the Local Investment Department,
KIA has set up several companies in the last few years,
primarily to promote investment in Kuwait.

The Kuwait Investment Authority, as the oldest sovereign wealth fund,
was created to invest abroad in order to diversify the local economy. While KIA
has indeed contributed to the fiscal stability of Kuwait by boosting the
government’s revenues significantly over the years, it was not established to
engage directly in domestic investments. However, in the wake of the global
financial crisis, traditional funds like KIA, who have been primarily
internationally focused, have received a new wave of domestic pressure to rethink
their strategies with the direct needs of the local economy in mind.
While many traditional sovereign wealth funds have long been critiqued
for not directly investing in the local economy and thus not benefitting the people
of the country, KIA was the first of the traditional funds to actually give in to
domestic economic concerns. “In December 2008, the KIA launched a fund on
behalf of the Kuwaiti government to stabilize the local stock market, which had
fallen 38% in 2008.”161 In addition to this stabilizing move in 2008, managing
director, Bader al-Saad, asserts that KIA is looking to play a larger role in
strengthening the private sector, developing local human capital and facilitating
the transfer of technology. However, Al-Saad also acknowledges the difficulty of
this role: “we don’t want people criticizing us for not investing locally, but if we
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did, we would find ourselves competing with the private sector.”162 Thus, KIA’s
strategy is to complement the private sector by investing in the sectors it shies
away from instead of directly competing with it.
One excellent example of how KIA is strategically complementing the
Private sector is its creation of the Kuwait Small Project Development Company
(KSPDC). In 1997 KIA established KSPDC as a venture capital firm in order to
assist young Kuwaiti nationals establish their own small-midsize enterprises. As
a matter of practice, KSPDC can provide a maximum of 80%, up to 400,000
dinars, of the capital needed to start a business. Gradually, KSPDC works with
the entrepreneur until he or she is able to buy them out.
Kuwaiti national, Bedoor al Mutairi is just one of several entrepreneurs to
benefit from KSPDC’s support. After experiencing the frustrating and negative
connotation associated with women riding in taxis in Kuwait (due to the
conservative values of Kuwaiti society) Mutairi asked herself: “why does
someone not start a taxi company with women drivers for an exclusively female
clientele?”163 Mutairi soon realized that a similar concept was already in place in
Dubai, Tehran and Beirut and with the support of KSPDC, she was able to bring
the same opportunity to Kuwait. “Companies that sell products and services to
women are clamoring to have their brochures placed in the cabs and Ms al Mutairi
gets about 20 calls a day from Kuwaiti women saying they want to try the
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service.”164 Hopefully Mutairi’s successful business venture will inspire other
young Kuwaitis to follow in her footsteps.
While KIA does explicitly lay out its role in the local economy, it has
always maintained a very passive and indirect approach to local investments up
until the financial crisis. Although KIA stepped in when the Kuwaiti economy
was suffering, it will most likely continue to prefer its traditional role of investing
abroad over taking a more aggressive approach to domestic development.
However, the creation of subsidiaries in order to complement and support the
growth of the private sector, such as the Kuwait Small Projects Development
Company, illuminates how KIA does greatly impact the domestic economy of
Kuwait, albeit indirectly.

Qatar
Like many other Middle Eastern countries, Qatar too started out as a poor
nation with an economy based solely on pearling up until the discovery of oil in
1940. After gaining independence in 1971, Qatar continued to suffer due to the
siphoning off of petroleum revenues the hands of a corrupt Amir until 1995 when
he was overthrown. Starting in 1995 Qatar embarked on a process of economic
transformation to “transform its former rent-based economy into a knowledgebased, service-orientated society.”165 The most obvious result of this
transformation is the fact that even despite the global financial crisis, Qatar has
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the world’s highest growth rate at an impressive 19.4% and the highest GDP per
capita in the world of $145,300.166
Although Qatar has indeed undergone a major transformation, there are
still areas in need of improvement. Today, “economic policy is focused on
developing Qatar’s nonassociated natural gas reserves and increasing private and
foreign investment in non-energy sectors.”167 This is crucial due to the fact that
oil and gas still account for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of export earnings and
70% of government revenues.168 In addition, the country could benefit from
increased diversification by further developing its service sector and agricultural
sector, which represent 21.1% and .1% respectively.169

Qatar Investment Authority

In comparison with traditional sovereign wealth funds like KIA and
ADIA, the Qatar Investment Authority best exemplifies the second generation of
SWFs, characterized by a much more active and aggressive investment style when
compared to their predecessors. Although only recently established in 2005, QIA
has rapidly become notorious for making large, high profile investments in
European companies such as Volkswagen, Credit Suisse and Barclays. In fact,
QIA was the most active SWF investor throughout the global financial crisis
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because while most funds significantly cut back on investments, QIA continued to
pursue an active investment strategy.
However, this does not mean that the country of Qatar did not feel the
effects of the global financial crises. Similarly to KIA, in 2008 QIA was also
called upon by the local Qatari government to invest “$5.3 billion into the local
financial sector to buy a 20% stake in all the banks listed on the Qatar stock
exchange.”170 Although QIA is part of the second generation of sovereign wealth
funds, its main credo is still to build a global investment portfolio in order to
achieve income diversification for the country of Qatar. In other words, although
it is much more aggressive than its traditional predecessors, it has not shifted its
core purpose and it will not operate as a development fund in wake of the
financial crisis. Instead, what these second generation SWFs have started to do to
respond to local pressures is to designate a preexisting segment of the fund to
engage in domestic development. For QIA, this role was assigned to its real
estate development arm Qatari Diar.
Qatari Diar is “fully owned by the Qatar Investment Authority and was
founded to support Qatar’s rapidly expanding economy and to provide structure
and quality control for the country’s real estate development priorities.”171 The
most prominent example of Qatari Diar’s mission in terms of domestic
development was its $26 billion deal with “Germany’s national railway operator,
Deutsche Bahn AG (DB), to build a railroad network over 15 years” in a joint
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venture with the Qatar Railways Development Company.172 The railroad network
will include a metro system in the city of Doha, a light rail in Lusail as well as a
high-speed line between Qatar and its neighbors Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The
benefits of this joint venture are indeed quite significant:
By increasing Qatar’s links to regional markets and
improving export routes this project is central to the
diversification of the emirate’s economy, which is largely
reliant on oil exports. The cooperation will also include DB
providing vocational training in the rail sector for young
Qataris, helping the transfer of valuable expertise to the local
population.173
By embodying the key long-term development goals such as production
diversification, job creation, and knowledge and technology transfer, Qatari
Diar’s joint venture is an excellent example of an investment made in order to
truly advance the long-term development goals of Qatar.

United Arab Emirates
One of the greatest stories of state transformation is that of the UAE.
Over thirty years ago in 1971, seven tiny tribal states in the Persian Gulf came
together to form the United Arab Emirates. Over the next thirty plus years, the
UAE managed to transform itself from a poor, desolate fishing and pearling
community into a modern state rivaling many Western nations. “Not too long,
there were no air-conditioned buildings in the UAE - in fact, there was no
electricity network to provide relief from the searing heat of the summer months.
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Suddenly all this changed with the discovery of oil.”174 After witnessing fellow
oil-exporting countries’ tribulations after the discovery of oil, the UAE was
determined to follow a different, more prosperous path. As Sheikh Abdullah bin
Zayed Al Nahyan, UAE Minister of Information and Culture, states “the social
and cultural well-being of our society has been the target of our planning, and all
other aspects of our development, be they economic, political, social or
environmental, stem from this consideration.”175
To what degree has the UAE succeeded in their mission? For starters,
from 1995 to 2008, UAE GDP increased more than 500% from $46 billion to
$240 billion.176 This tremendous growth can be attributed to fact that the country
has the fifth largest oil reserves in the world. One of the greatest pieces of
evidence demonstrating the UAE’s success in achieving economic diversification
is that unlike Qatar and Kuwait, it has been able to reduce the portion of GDP
based on oil and gas to 25%.177 This is due to the “progressive economic agenda
built around economic liberalization, diversification and enhancing the role of the
private sector.”178 The Emirate of Dubai is an excellent example of this policy
due to focusing “its attention of the development of the services sector, tourism
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and large-scale real estate projects.”179 Some of the most notorious projects
include the world’s only seven-star hotel, the Burj al-Arab, or the world’s tallest
tower, the Burj Dubai, and the infamous Palm Islands, the largest man-made
islands in the world.180
However, despite all of the UAE’s tremendous strides in economic
development, it too was not immune from the global financial crisis in 2008.
After 2008, the UAE’s growth rate started to slow along with the majority of
countries around the world. Furthermore, while Dubai has become a symbol of
modernity, massive financial wealth and prosperity it was also hit the hardest out
of the Emirates due to its prominent real estate and finance sector. Large-scale
projects were not able to receive funding due to severely depressed real estate
prices, prompting worries about the future of Dubai. Luckily, Dubai received
funding from the central banks as well as its neighboring Emirate, Abu Dhabi.
Even with all of the remarkable growth experienced by the UAE over the
past thirty plus years, the recent global financial crisis revealed that there is still
plenty of work to be done. “Dependence on oil, a large expatriate workforce, and
growing inflation pressures are significant long-term challenges.”181 To address
these long-term concerns, the government has implemented a plan focusing on
“diversification and creating more opportunities for nationals through improved
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education and increase private sector employment.”182 Given the country’s track
record and consistent emphasis on socio-economic development, the plan will
hopefully lead the UAE to even more success and prosperity in the future.
Mubadala Development Company
Due to the fact that most sovereign wealth funds, especially first
generation, but also second generation funds, are not designed or willing to
actively engage in direct investments in the local economy, a new generation of
sovereign wealth funds has emerged to fill this position.
Beyond achieving high returns on investments, some of these
funds were specifically tasked by their governments to
transfer technology, build infrastructure, establish health and
transportation services and create new industries, basically to
contribute to the development of the nation.183
Since the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the largest sovereign wealth fund in
the world, “as a matter of practice, does not invest in the UAE,”184 in 2002 the
government of Abu Dhabi created separate entity known as the Mubadala
Development Company in order to facilitate the diversification of Abu Dhabi’s
economy.
Mubadala is “a business development and investment company whose
mandate is to expand not just the emirate’s wealth but also to create industries that
will develop the economy.”185 It is primarily focused on targeting key industries
such as energy, healthcare, aerospace, information and telecommunications,
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infrastructure, real estate and hospitality and services.186 On one hand, Mubadala
acts like more traditional SWFs by pursuing high profile, long-term international
investments with the goal of receiving a high rate of return. However, the
difference is that it will not make an investment that will not deliver “strong social
returns to Abu Dhabi and the United Arab Emirates.”187 Social benefits include
knowledge and technology transfer, employment opportunities for citizens and
attracting further direct investment.
The best example of what Mubadala and other sovereign wealth funds of
this type are aiming to achieve is the extremely high profile $8 billion joint
venture between Mubadala and General Electric in 2008. “The venture is focused
on diverse initiatives including commercial finance, clean energy research and
development, aviation and corporate learning.”188 The benefits for Mubadala and
the UAE include the following: knowledge transfer via an established training
program sponsored by GE, technology transfer in terms of clean energy and
aviation technology as well as infrastructure, job creation and industry
development. At the same time, the joint venture provides significant benefits for
GE as well including the fact that Mubadala became a top ten shareholder in GE
and that the partnership will open up access for GE to a new market and a new
region altogether. All in all, the Mubadala Development Company represents the
ideal marriage between income diversification as well as production
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diversification and will continue to provide meaningful contributions to not only
the UAE, but to the entire region as well.
The main takeaway message regarding the significance of the global
financial crisis is realization that sovereign wealth funds “were no different from
other institutional investors; they had not been immune from the ravages of the
recession”189 and more importantly it revealed that their own domestic economies
were in significant need of assistance. Besides the suffering experienced in the
local financial sectors, the crisis revealed the primary long-term development
goals for the countries including knowledge and technology transfer, private
sector development, and huge overall need for job creation. Pressure and critique
mounted as many locals were witnessing sovereign wealth funds bail out failing
Western institutions without bailing out their own domestic economies, prompting
SWFs to reassess their investment strategies.
In terms of the first generation of SWFs, although some like KIA helped
financially prop up the local financial industry, their role has remained basically
unchanged: they were not established to perform direct local investment.
However, after further examination we discovered a trend of indirect domestic
investment on behalf of both traditional funds like KIA and second-generation
funds like QIA. For KIA, this meant the establishment of a separate entity to
promote the growth of emerging private enterprises while QIA opted to allocate a
pre-existing section of the fund to carry out direct local investments.
Furthermore, when SWFs like ADIA were completely reluctant to change their
investment strategy to include domestic investments, the government established
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a third generation of SWFs, like Mubadala, as a designated direct investor. What
all three funds have in common is the fact that although some are more focused
on domestic economic development, all three remain very active abroad.
The difference between the three generations of SWFs in terms of their
impact on domestic socio-economic development is the degree to which the fund
combines income diversification and production diversification. Traditionally,
SWFs have only been successful in terms of income diversification because their
main goal has been to turn oil, a depletable and non-renewable asset, into a
financial asset. While this is key for income diversification, the problem is that
financial assets are just as depletable and non-renewable as oil. In other words,
they do not count as real investments. “Wealth cannot simply be created by
financial and/or monetary devices. Wealth can only be created by adding to the
real assets on the ground.”190 Thus, only the sovereign wealth funds that ‘add real
assets on the ground’ like, knowledge and technology transfer, job creation and
industry development can truly claim that they are successfully promoting and
achieving economic development.
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Concluding Thoughts:
More often than not, the media is prone to framing relatively unknown
concepts in terms of good and bad in an attempt to simplify an issue for the
public. However, the problem with this method is that it also leads to a
detachment from rational thought in lieu of sensationalist rhetoric. Unfortunately,
sovereign wealth funds are the latest victim of the polarizing treatment by the
media and consequently their image has been reduced to simply: villains or
heroes. However, because SWFs are a heterogeneous and complex class of
investors, it is neither realistic nor pragmatic to view SWFs in terms of good or
bad. Thus, throughout this study it has been my goal to explore the various
images of sovereign wealth funds in an attempt to isolate sensationalist claims.
As a result, we are left with a more rational and realistic perspective of what
sovereign wealth funds truly symbolize.
Represent Shift in Global Financial Power
Early in the 20th century, the world experienced a major power shift from
the dominance of oil consuming countries by ‘the Majors’ to the increased
sovereignty of oil-exporting countries via the formation of OPEC. With the
commencement of the 21st century, the world witnessed another significant shift
in financial power and redistribution of global wealth. With rising oil prices, oilexporting nations once again accumulated massive revenues and emerging
markets, particularly Asian countries, were experiencing rapid economic growth.
At the same time, Western developed countries like the United States and Europe
were experiencing current account deficits and an ensuing financial crisis. While
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Western financial institution largely dominated the 20th century, the financial
crisis exposed their weaknesses and provided an opportunity for new players,
specifically oil-exporting countries and emerging markets, to enter the
international markets and compete for financial clout.
One can say that sovereign wealth funds capitalized on this opportunity
and emerged as major players in international finance. While this symbolizes the
geographic shift in financial power from the West to the East, it is also indicative
of another change. Since SWFs are an extension a government, their rise
represents a more general trend of the rise in state-capitalism as opposed to
traditional free-market capitalism. “This emerging and growing framework is at
sharp variance with today’s general conception of a market-based global economy
and financial system.”191 For many, this ‘variance’ has been the main cause for
concern regarding the motives of SWFs. While the West in particular is
uncomfortable with the prospect of foreign governments dominating global
financial markets, the real fear is the potential for protectionist backlash if the
West is unable to come to terms and adapt to the financial landscape of the future.
Behave as Rational Investors
Although the West is concerned about the potential for sovereign wealth
funds to be manipulated in order to achieve political motives there is little
evidence to date to validate this fear. In fact, “empirical evidence indicates that
SWFs have behaved as economically rational investors who seek to maximize
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their profits through the proper combination of risk and return.”192 They pursue
long-term investments, a highly diversified portfolio both geographically and by
asset class, they have low levels of debt by avoiding the practice of leveraging
and they minimize exposure to liquidity risks by maintaining an excess level of
reserves. All of the aforementioned attributes allowed SWFs to exhibit anticyclical behavior during the recent financial crisis and confirmed their role as a
stabilizing force on global financial markets.
All in all, sovereign wealth funds should be viewed as a rational
institutional investor. Although all types of investors have been the subjects of
critique during the financial crisis, there are some positive attributes separating
sovereign wealth funds from other type of financial investors. Thus, sovereign
wealth funds think the world should “relax a little. We are only thinking about
noncontrolling, conventional investments. We’re not the sell-side firms, thinking
‘proprietary trading’. We’re not the exchanges, thinking ‘consolidation’. We’re
not the private equity firms, thinking ‘management control’. And we’re not the
hedge funds, thinking ‘leverage.’”193 While the world of finance is far from
perfect, SWF’s clean track record should speak for itself and they should at least
be treated to the courtesy of innocent until proven guilty.
Reinforce State Sovereignty
Whenever the issues of oil-exporting nations and petrodollars are brought
to the table the most popular question raised is the following: how are the
petrodollars being invested? According to traditional literature, there is only one
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avenue for petrodollars to flow and that is directly into the corrupt coffers of the
national government. As a result, oil-exporting countries inevitably fall victim to
the resource curse.

By expanding the scope of traditional literature to include

the role of global financial markets, sovereign wealth funds emerged as the main
vehicle for petrodollar recycling.
Without a doubt, the rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds secured them a seat
at the table with the other major players in international finance. However, what
has this emergence meant for the SWF’s domestic economies and home
countries? To address this question I sought out to explore the extent to which
sovereign wealth funds could serve as tools for economic development.
However, sovereign wealth funds, at the core, were not established to engage
directly in domestic development. While the financial crisis of 2008 led many
SWFs to restructure and reconsider the pressing needs of their domestic
economies it wasn’t necessarily their responsibility to intervene. Thus, when
SWFs received criticism for not investing enough in their local economies, the
age-old problem regarding the efficiency of petrodollar recycling appears to
remain unchanged. However, this is not entirely bad news. On the flip side, we
did see the development of a new type of sovereign wealth fund, sovereign
development funds, whose responsibility is to pursue only investments that are in
line with long-term economic development.
In conclusion, the expansion of the narrow traditional perspective to a new
international one highlights a wide array of implications for both global financial
markets and the home countries of sovereign wealth funds. First, sovereign
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wealth funds represent a general shift in financial power away from the West and
towards emerging markets. While this trend has sparked fears and concerns
regarding the potential political motivations of SWFs, their track record
demonstrates that these fears have been overstated. While sovereign wealth funds
should not be viewed in terms of villains or heroes, they should be taken seriously
as major financial players.
Furthermore, they symbolize the fact that oil-exporting nations learned
from the mistakes they made in previous booms and decided to save revenues for
the future in lieu of excessive spending in the present. Not only do sovereign
wealth funds secure their nations’ wealth for future generations, but also most
importantly, their role as major players in international finance reinforces oilexporting countries’ sense of sovereignty and power on the world stage.
Lastly, when it comes to the potential role of sovereign wealth funds in
economic development the answer is not as conclusive. Traditional sovereign
wealth funds, like ADIA, do not directly contribute to the long-term development
goals of their country and thus should not be viewed as tools for economic
development. However, while the goal of my thesis was not to evaluate the
effectiveness of SWFs as tools for economic development, I do want to highlight
the potential for a new type of development strategy that is aligned with global
financial markets. All in all, while the impact of sovereign wealth funds on
international financial markets and their domestic economies may continue to
evolve, it is important to continue to evaluate SWFs in a realistic and pragmatic
manner rather than fall victim to sensationalist claims.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: List of Largest Sovereign Wealth Funds by Year Established
LARGEST SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS BY YEAR ESTABLISHED
Country
Kuwait

Fund Name

Assets
$ Billion

Year
Established

Type

Kuwait Investment Authority

$260

1953

Oil

Kiribati

Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund

$0.40

1956

Phosphates

US – New Mexico

New Mexico State Investment Council

$13.80

1958

Non-Commodity

Singapore

Temasek Holdings

$145.30

1974

Non-Commodity

US – Wyoming

Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust
Fund

$4.70

1974

Minerals

UAE – Abu Dhabi

Abu Dhabi Investment Authority

$627

1976

Oil

US – Alaska

Alaska Permanent Fund

$39.70

1976

Oil

Canada

Alberta’s Heritage Fund

$14.40

1976

Oil

Oman

State General Reserve Fund

$8.20

1980

Oil & Gas

Singapore

Government of Singapore
Investment Corporation

$247.50

1981

Non-Commodity

Brunei

Brunei Investment Agency

$30

1983

Oil

UAE – Abu Dhabi

International Petroleum
Investment Company

$48.20

1984

Oil

Chile

Social and Economic Stabilization
Fund

$21.80

1985

Copper

Norway

Government Pension Fund – Global

$556.80

1990

Oil

China – Hong Kong

Hong Kong Monetary
Authority Investment Portfolio

$292.30

1993

Non-Commodity

Malaysia

Khazanah Nasional

$36.80

1993

Non-Commodity

Botswana

Pula Fund

$6.90

1994

China

SAFE Investment Company

$347.1**

1997

Diamonds &
Minerals
Non-Commodity

Venezuela

FEM

$0.80

1998

Oil

Iran

Oil Stabilisation Fund

$23

1999

Oil

Azerbaijan

State Oil Fund

$21.70

1999

Oil

China

National Social Security Fund

$146.50

2000

Non-Commodity

Algeria

Revenue Regulation Fund

$56.70

2000

Oil

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan National Fund

$38.60

2000

Oil

Trinidad & Tobago

Heritage and Stabilization Fund

$2.90

2000

Oil

Ireland

National Pensions Reserve Fund

$33

2001

Non-Commodity

UAE – Abu Dhabi

Mubadala Development Company

$13.30

2002

Oil

New Zealand

New Zealand Superannuation Fund

$12.10

2003

Non-Commodity

Australia

Australian Future Fund

$72.90

2004

Non-Commodity

Nigeria

Excess Crude Account

$0.50

2004

Oil

Qatar

Qatar Investment Authority

$85

2005

Oil

South Korea

Korea Investment Corporation

$37

2005

Non-Commodity

East Timor

Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund

$6.30

2005

Oil & Gas
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UAE – Ras Al
Khaimah

RAK Investment Authority

$1.20

Libya

Libyan Investment Authority

$70

2006

Oil

UAE – Dubai

Investment Corporation of Dubai

$19.60

2006

Oil

Bahrain

Mumtalakat Holding Company

$9.10

2006

Oil

Vietnam

State Capital Investment Corporation

$0.50

2006

Non-Commodity

Indonesia

Government Investment Unit

$0.30

2006

Non-Commodity

Mauritania

National Fund for Hydrocarbon
Reserves

$0.30

2006

Oil & Gas

Oman

Oman Investment Fund

n/a

2006

Oil

China

China Investment Corporation

$332.40

2007

Non-Commodity

China

China-Africa Development Fund

$5.00

2007

Non-Commodity

UAE – Federal

Emirates Investment Authority

n/a

2007

Oil

UAE – Abu Dhabi

Abu Dhabi Investment Council

n/a

2007

Oil

Russia

National Welfare Fund

$142.5*

2008

Oil

2005

Oil

France

Strategic Investment Fund

$28

2008

Non-Commodity

Saudi Arabia

Public Investment Fund

$5.30

2008

Oil

Brazil

Sovereign Fund of Brazil

$8.60

2009

Non-Commodity

Saudi Arabia

SAMA Foreign Holdings

$439.10

n/a

Oil

Total Oil & Gas Related

$2,520.20

Total Other

$1,792.90

TOTAL

$4,313.10

*This includes the oil stabilization fund of Russia.
**This number is a best guess estimation.
***All figures quoted are from official sources, or, where the institutions concerned do not issue statistics of their
assets, from other publicly available sources. Some of these figures are best estimates as market values change day to
day.
Source: "Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings." Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Mar. 2011. Web. 24 Apr. 2011.
<http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/>.
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Table 2: Main Investments by GCC SWFs in Western Financial Institutions (2007-2008)
Sovereign Wealth Fund

Target of Investment

Value in USD Billion

Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority (ADIA)

Citigroup

7.6

Kuwait Investment Authority
(KIA)

Merrill Lynch

3.4

Qatar Investment Authority

London Stock Exchange

2.0

Mubadala Development
Company

The Carlyle Group

1.35

Dubai International Capital

HSBC

1.0

Qatar Investment Authority

Credit Suisse

.603

Adapted from: Roland Beck & Michael Fidora, The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on
Global Financial Markets (Frankfurt: European Central Bank, 2008) 11. & M. Asutay, GCC
SWFs and Their Role in the European and American Markets (UK: Equilibri, 2008) 7.
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Figure 1:: World Nominal Oil Price Chronology: 1970
1970-2007

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Annual Oil Market Chronology," 2008, Energy
Information Administration, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/aomc/overview.html>. Last Accessed:
23 April 2011.
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Summary of Capstone Project
As a double major in Economics and International Relations, oil has been
of the most frequently discussed and reoccurring topics in my academic career.
Specifically, most conversation revolved around petrodollars—the revenues
generated from oil—and the degree to which they were being recycled efficiently.
A general trend started to emerge in that regardless of how many times the subject
of petrodollars was mentioned, the argument always took the same form: although
a massive amount of revenue was generated for members of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries during the 1973 oil boom, they were always
channeled directly into the hands of the elite and resulted in widespread
inequality, corruption and economic decay. Up until my junior year I was
satisfied and accepted this conclusion at face value. However, three little words
changed my entire perspective and became the subject of my Senior Capstone
Project: Sovereign Wealth Funds.
I was first introduced to the concept of Sovereign Wealth Funds when I
was given the largest SWF in the world, The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, as
my client and asked to assess the degree to which the fund recycles petrodollars
efficiently. I was expecting to write the same traditional argument namely that as
an extension of the government, the oil revenues channeled into SWFs like the
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, either ended up in the pockets of the fund’s
leaders or wasted on lavish inefficient projects. On the contrary, I was shocked to
discover that the majority of oil revenues were actually being channeled through
these so-called sovereign wealth funds into global financial markets. This
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discovery became the basic premise and topic of the first section of my Capstone:
The traditional literature on oil-exporting nations failed to notice this phenomenon
because they were limiting their perspective to the national and local level.
Hence, the aim of my thesis was to examine how the discussion of oil-exporting
country’s revenues changes once the scope is expanded to an international
perspective.
In order to assess the implications that arise from this shift in perspective,
I separated my Capstone into five main sections. As previously mentioned, the
first section serves as a review of the traditional literature regarding oil-exporting
nations. It assesses the classic tale of oil-exporters and concludes with the
introduction of a new actor for managing oil revenues: Sovereign Wealth Funds
(SWFs). Although the first SWF dates back to 1953, they remained relatively
in the shadows until roughly ten years ago. In fact, the term sovereign wealth
fund itself was only coined recently in 2005. Hence, since they are a relatively
unknown concept, section two serves as a general introduction to sovereign
wealth funds. Generally speaking, sovereign wealth funds are the investment
arms of governments charged with the responsibility of recycling wealth
from commodity (oil) revenues by reinvesting it in international financial
markets. While there are many different types and variations of sovereign
wealth funds, for the purpose of this study, I focused only on oil-based
commodity funds located in the Middle East.
To gain a better understanding of the nature of sovereign wealth
funds, in section three I took a closer look at the three most prominent SWFs
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in the Middle East in terms of their participation in global financial markets. I
discovered two trends after examining the history, mission statement and
investment strategies of The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA - the oldest
SWF), The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA - the largest SWFs), and The
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA - the new comer). The first discovery was an
increased appetite for risk on behalf of all three SWFs, with newer funds like QIA
demonstrating more aggressive and progressive investment behavior than the
more reserved and traditional funds like KIA. Regardless of the type of
investment strategy, what is evident is that both traditional and newer sovereign
wealth funds have acquired a preference for high profile investments in major
Western companies, especially financially troubled ones.
Investments like ADIA’s 7.6 billion dollar investment in Citigroup and
KIA’s 3.4 billion dollar investment in Merrill Lynch not only signified the
successful evolution of sovereign wealth funds from relatively unknown entities
to major players in the world of international finance, but they also ignited two
heated debates. The first is the topic of the fourth section of my Capstone and
regards the potential impact of SWFs on global financial markets. Specifically,
do SWFs represent a stabilizing or destabilizing force on international financial
markets? On the one hand, SWFs were viewed as stabilizing forces on the market
by providing much needed liquidity to failing Western financial institutions. On
the other hand, the very fact that they represent a foreign government conjured up
xenophobic sentiments regarding the potential of hidden political motivations.
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The second debate and topic of the last section of my Capstone, considers
what this emergence has meant for the domestic economies and home countries of
sovereign wealth funds. It is a return to the more traditional context by asking to
what extent do the investments of sovereign wealth funds provide socio-economic
benefits to their citizens? The rise of SWFs along with the financial crisis of
2008 led SWFs to restructure and reconsider the pressing needs of their
domestic economies and citizens. In terms of the older, more traditional
sovereign wealth funds like ADIA, their role has remained unchanged: they were
not established to perform direct local investment. On the other hand, in response
to an underdeveloped private sector, a rapidly growing national labor force and a
high dependence on foreign labor, funds like KIA established a separate entity to
promote the growth of emerging private enterprises while some like QIA opted to
allocate a pre-existing section of the fund to carry out direct local investments.
Lastly, since most traditional sovereign wealth funds were not designed nor
intended to directly achieve socio-economic objectives, we have seen the
development of a new kind of SWF created with the sole purpose of investing
domestically.
The expansion of the narrow traditional perspective to a new international
one highlights a wide array of implications for both global financial markets and
the home countries of sovereign wealth funds. To commence, sovereign wealth
funds represent a general shift in financial power away from the West and
towards emerging markets. While this trend has sparked fears and concerns
regarding the potential political motivations of SWFs, their track record
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demonstrates that these fears have been overstated. While sovereign wealth funds
should not be viewed in terms of villains or heroes, they should be taken seriously
as major financial players. Furthermore, it is also important to acknowledge the
new found sense of sovereignty and bargaining power accompanying this position
as well. Lastly, when it comes to the potential role of sovereign wealth funds in
economic development the answer is not as conclusive. While the goal of my
thesis was not to evaluate the effectiveness of SWFs as tools for economic
development, I do want to highlight the potential for a new type of development
strategy that is aligned with global financial markets. All in all, while the impact
of sovereign wealth funds on international financial markets and their domestic
economies may continue to evolve, it is important to continue to evaluate SWFs
in a realistic and pragmatic manner rather than fall victim to sensationalist claims.

